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xABSTRACT
Gu, Zhongshu PhD, Purdue University, August 2015. Securing Virtualized System via
Active Protection. Major Professor: Dongyan Xu.
Virtualization is the predominant enabling technology of current cloud infrastructures
and brings unique security benefits. Traditionally, researchers strive to include security
components, such as intrusion detection, malware analysis, and integrity check, into un-
derlying hypervisors. These hypervisor-based security approaches conduct only passive
monitoring on the guest systems, but lack active protection mechanisms, i.e., patching the
system vulnerabilities, eliminating the malicious logic, and shrinking the kernel attack sur-
face, etc.
In order to achieve the security goals that are missing in existing hypervisor-based re-
search efforts, we aim to expand the reach of the hypervisor to support active protection
mechanisms. In this dissertation, we present a hypervisor-based security framework that
consists of three key components, PROCESS-IMPLANTING, DRIP, and FACE-CHANGE to
provide active protection at the level of user processes, kernel drivers, and OS kernels re-
spectively, within guest virtual machines (VM). In particular, PROCESS-IMPLANTING en-
ables on-demand implantation of general-purpose security tools directly from a hypervisor
into a guest VM. The dynamic and stealthy nature of such security tools makes them harder
to be predicted and detected by malicious adversaries. DRIP targets in-VM trojaned kernel
drivers, which carry both benign and malicious logic. We conduct purification on such
trojaned drivers to systematically deactivate the malicious logic and keep the benign logic
intact. FACE-CHANGE minimizes the kernel attack surface within guest VMs at fine time-
granularity. We achieve such kernel minimalism through dynamic switching of multiple
application-specific minimized kernels at runtime.
xi
From our evaluation results on both security and performance metrics, we demonstrate
that PROCESS-IMPLANTING, DRIP, and FACE-CHANGE, can effectively provide active
protection for the guest VM with minimum negative impact on the guest system execu-
tion. Furthermore, it is practical to deploy our security framework in the real-world cloud
infrastructures considering its reasonable performance overhead.
11 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Dissertation Statement
Traditional computing systems are under increasing threats from advanced malware
attacks. Emerging malware against operating systems (OS) exhibits more sophisticated
strategies and behaviors. For example, recently advanced malware is able to actively de-
tect, disable, or bypass security checks embedded in the operating system; kernel-level
rootkits of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) help hiding the presence of user-level ma-
licious “accomplice” in the victim machines; trojaned kernel drivers can stealthily execute
malicious functionalities under the cover of a benign cloak.
Virtualization has been widely adopted in the cloud computing infrastructures. It im-
proves the utilization of limited hardware resources and facilitates central administrative
tasks for managing guest virtual machines (VM). In addition, virtualization techniques
hold unique advantages from security perspectives. The hypervisor (a.k.a. virtual machine
monitor) provides an intermediate and confined computing environment to isolate the guest
VM execution from underlying hardware. Assuming the guest system is compromised by
some user-level malware or kernel-level rootkits, the trusted hypervisor is still able to en-
close the malicious tampering within the virtual machine and avoid the harm to the host
system.
Traditionally, security researchers retrofit underlying hypervisors to enable intrusion
detection, malware analysis, and enforcement of kernel integrity within guest VMs, but
leaving the guest systems “untouched” — the security tools resident at the hypervisor level
only monitor the guest VM execution passively and trigger the alarm in the event of anoma-
lous execution. But we expect that the hypervisor can achieve more than only passively
monitoring the guest system. For example, if we have identified footprints of some ma-
licious logic, is it possible to actively track its execution and eliminate the influence of
2its malicious behavior? If we find that a guest system has some disclosed vulnerabilities
that may be exploited in the future, is it possible to patch the system automatically to fix
such loopholes? If we discover that a guest OS kernel expose larger-than-minimum ker-
nel functionalities to applications running within a VM, is it possible to shrink this kernel
to minimize its attack surface? These active protection mechanisms are missing in exist-
ing hypervisor-based research efforts. Compared to passive monitoring approaches, active
protection mechanisms pose numerous technical challenges. For passive monitoring tech-
niques, the execution of their hypervisor-based security components could be decoupled
from the guest VM’s execution. But achieving the active protection mechanisms men-
tioned above requires precise system interventions and “surgical” manipulations of the sys-
tem state. We need to guarantee that we could safely and transparently operate on guest
systems without breaking the consistency of their execution state.
1.2 Contributions
My research aims to expand the reach of the hypervisor and introduces active protection
mechanisms into the hypervisor. At the same time, we guarantee that enabling hypervisor-
based active protection components does not incur negative impacts on the execution of
guest VMs.
The contributions of this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
• We present an integrated hypervisor-based security framework that consists of three
key components, PROCESS-IMPLANTING [1], DRIP [2], and FACE-CHANGE [3].
Each component provides active protection to different system layers within the guest
VM.
• PROCESS-IMPLANTING is an active VM introspection technique, which enables on-
demand implantation of a general-purpose program directly from a hypervisor into
a guest VM. The dynamic and stealthy nature of the implanted processes makes
them harder to be predicted and detected by malicious adversaries. We also propose
3various application scenarios of this technique in the areas of both security and cloud
VM management.
• DRIP1 is the first purification technique to systematically deactivate embedded mali-
cious logic of trojaned kernel drivers. The purified kernel drivers could still preserve
the benign logic and function the same as their original versions.
• FACE-CHANGE is a virtualization-based technique to shrink the kernel attack sur-
face for applications running within the VM. Compared to existing system-wide ker-
nel minimization approaches, FACE-CHANGE takes one step further to facilitate dy-
namic switching of multiple application-specific minimized kernels at runtime, thus
enabling minimization of the kernel attack surface at finer time-granularity.
1.3 Overview of the Active Protection Framework
Figure 1.1.: Three key components of our hypervisor-based active protection framework
1DRIP stands for “DRIver Purifier”
4Figure 1.1 illustrates the architectural overview of our security framework. Each com-
ponent in our framework provides active protection to system entities at different layers
within the guest VM. PROCESS-IMPLANTING (abbreviated as PI in Figure 1.1) manip-
ulates the user process, DRIP targets the kernel drivers loaded in the kernel space, and
FACE-CHANGE operates directly on the OS kernel. Below we give a brief introduction for
each component.
1.3.1 PROCESS-IMPLANTING
The static nature of security tools in the system makes them exposed explicitly to ma-
licious attacks. Adversaries could have enough time to study a system in advance, identify
its vulnerabilities, and choose the right timing to drop their malware. When malware starts
to execute, typically the first and most pivotal task is to deactivate security tools installed
in the system to make itself under the radar.
In order to prevent security tools from becoming obvious targets of malicious attacks,
PROCESS-IMPLANTING intends to make them dynamic and stealthy. Instead of statically
installing security tools in the guest system, PROCESS-IMPLANTING randomly select a
running process (denoted as a victim process) at runtime as camouflage, save its runtime
state, and directly implant our security program (denoted as an implanted process) into
guest VM from the hypervisor to reuse the victim process context. As such, the implanted
process borrow some time slices from the victim process and execute the security logic un-
der the cover of its running context. Furthermore, when the implanted process is scheduled
out at context switch, PROCESS-IMPLANTING temporarily recover the memory mapping
for this victim process to escape malicious memory inspections from other process. When
the implanted security tool finishes its task, PROCESS-IMPLANTING could silently recover
the execution of victim process from the checkpoint with no negative impact on the whole
system.
From the view of an adversary, with PROCESS-IMPLANTING enabled, it becomes ex-
tremely difficult to pinpoint the security tool because: 1) The tool is dynamically implanted
5at runtime and no installation footprints exist in the guest system. 2) The tool runs under the
cover of a randomly-picked normal process without launching any suspicious new process.
1.3.2 DRIP
DRIP is an offline “purifier” targeting trojaned kernel drivers. Through investigation on
the typical trojaned kernel drivers, we gain the observation: within trojaned kernel drivers,
the malicious logic embedded inside them is typically orthogonal to its benign counterpart.
In addition, malicious code need to invoke kernel APIs to perform critical system opera-
tions and access kernel data. Removing those invocations from the malicious code could
neutralize the malicious behavior without affecting the driver’s original functions.
Based on this key observation, we develop a testing-driven approach called DRIP to
perform purification on trojaned kernel drivers. More specifically, we leverage application-
level test suites to cover the benign functionalities of the trojaned kernel drivers. DRIP
systematically derive a set of unneeded (i.e., the superset of malicious) kernel API invo-
cations in the subject kernel driver, while ensuring the correct execution of all test cases.
We could neutralize the hidden malicious logic by removing unnecessary kernel function
invocations.
1.3.3 FACE-CHANGE
Kernel minimization has already been established as an effective approach to reducing
the trusted computing base (TCB) of a system. In practice, even a highly specialized system
usually involves multiple applications. Correspondingly, the minimized kernel for the sys-
tem includes kernel code that is required by all these applications. However, we argue that
such a system-wide minimized kernel is not good enough because it creates a larger-than-
minimum attack surface. We observe that the kernel code required by different applications
varies significantly. To be more specific, our experiments show that two distinct applica-
tions may share as little as 33.6% of their required kernel code, thus system-wide kernel
minimization would over-approximate both applications’ kernel requirements.
6To address the problem, we develop the FACE-CHANGE component to support dynamic
switching of multiple minimized kernels in the same VM, with each kernel customized
for a specific application. We use the term kernel view to refer to the in-memory kernel
code needed by an individual application. FACE-CHANGE presents each application pro-
cess with a different, minimized kernel view, which is prepared individually in advance
by profiling the application’s kernel service needs. At runtime, upon a context switch,
FACE-CHANGE dynamically switches to the kernel view of the process for the next time
slice, achieving kernel minimalism with fine time-granularity. Compared with having only
one system-wide minimized kernel, FACE-CHANGE could prevent more malware attacks
because of the smaller attack surface it creates.
1.4 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation presents an integrated hypervisor-based security framework that con-
sists of three key components: PROCESS-IMPLANTING, DRIP, and FACE-CHANGE. Each
component address different research problems, but with the same research goal to provide
active protection from the hypervisor to the guest VM.
Here we give an outline of this dissertation:
• Chapter 1 explains the unique advantages that can be brought by introducing active
protection mechanism at the hypervisor level and research challenges that need to be
addressed. Then we present the overview of our hypervisor-based active protection
security framework. For each component within this framework, we demonstrate the
research problems it targets and the fundamental principles behind the techniques
respectively.
• Chapter 2 explains in more details about the motivation, design, implementation, and
evaluation of PROCESS-IMPLANTING. We also propose the application scenarios of
PROCESS-IMPLANTING in different areas.
7• Chapter 3 focuses on the offline purification component DRIP. We investigate the
unique properties of trojaned kernel drivers and explain the procedure of DRIP to
deactivate the malicious logic within such drivers.
• Chapter 4 presents our investigations on the limitations of existing system-wide ker-
nel minimization techniques and explains in detail how FACE-CHANGE can shrink
the kernel attack surface further at finer time-granularity for each individual applica-
tion.
• Chapter 5 discusses limitations of our current work and the future work we want to
pursue.
• Chapter 6 describes representative research efforts that are closely related to this
dissertation and compares our work with them.
• Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation.
82 PROCESS-IMPLANTING: PROCESS IMPLANTATION COMPONENT
2.1 Problem Statement
Security tools installed in the system to detect malware have become evident targets
of cyber-attacks. Malicious adversaries can study the security tools for a long time before
intruding into the system. To evade the detection, typically the first post-intrusion attack
launched by malware is to deactivate security tools, such as the anti-malware engine. In
order to be tamper-resistant to such attacks, existing research efforts leverage virtualization
technology to relocate in-VM security tools to the hypervisor. But viewing from the hyper-
visor, the whole VM is a blackbox, i.e., only byte-level execution information is exposed.
To monitor the execution of the guest system from the hypervisor, we need to reconstruct
the guest VM’s semantic view by using the virtual machine introspection (VMI) technique.
But the semantic gap [4] between the guest VM and hypervisor hinders us from obtaining
a complete semantic-rich view. Furthermore, currently hardware virtualization has become
the mainstream technique adopted in cloud infrastructures. Hardware virtualization is de-
signed to run most native instructions directly on the CPU and expose as few details as
possible to the hypervisor to gain higher performance. This makes the semantic gap prob-
lem more challenging. Previous VMI approaches can only passively detect [5–8] or mon-
itor attacks [9–11], but we expect to provide a general-purpose active protection solution,
for example, to deactivate malicious logic, track anomalous execution, or patch disclosed
vulnerabilities.
In this chapter, we present PROCESS-IMPLANTING, an active introspection component
in our hypervisor-based security framework. The key idea is to implant a process directly
from the hypervisor into the guest VM to bridge the semantic gap. The implanted process
runs under the cover of a running in-VM victim process and could gain in-context execution
environment of the running VM. We also design a series of coordination and protection
9mechanisms supported by the higher-privileged hypervisor to exempt the implanted process
from being tampered by the malware. Furthermore, after the implanted process exits, it
leaves no negative impact on the normal execution of the guest OS and the applications.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 proposes application sce-
narios for the PROCESS-IMPLANTING. Section 2.3 provides the detailed design of this
component and how it satisfies the security requirements. Section 2.4 describes the im-
plementation of our prototype. Section 2.5 evaluates performance and gives some repre-
sentative application cases in the areas of both security and cloud VM management. We
summarize PROCESS-IMPLANTING in Section 2.6.
2.2 Application Scenarios
There are several security implications of our PROCESS-IMPLANTING technique, as
illustrated in the following application scenarios:
2.2.1 Stealthy Tracking
We can leverage PROCESS-IMPLANTING to reveal the evidence of attack provenances
in a stealthy way. For example, tracing is a specialized use of logging to record the ex-
ecution of a program for the purpose of monitoring and debugging. Tools such as ltrace
and strace are widely used to monitor signals and library/system calls issued by a specific
process during runtime. These tools get the in-context semantic-rich tracing information
by executing inside the guest VM. But they are also vulnerable to attacks from malicious
adversaries. If a process running inside the virtual machine presents some suspicious be-
haviors, we can implant the tracing tool into the guest VM and attach it to this process
to gain more detailed evidence of its malicious operations. The result of tracing can be
sent from guest VM to the hypervisor directly through hypercall. The host-based audit-




If the system has already been compromised by the malware, PROCESS-IMPLANTING
can be utilized to recover the system to its normal state by removing affected files, quar-
antining suspicious malware executables, and restarting security services that have been
disabled. If any critical security vulnerability of guest VM is disclosed, the cloud provider
should be responsible to patch applications or a kernel of guest VM to enforce security
policies.
2.2.3 Performance Monitoring/Tuning
Performance monitoring of virtual machine is not that intuitive because there is an
extra layer between the guest VM and the hardware. The hypervisor only has the system-
wide performance view. When fine-grained monitoring is needed, performance data can be
collected by using PROCESS-IMPLANTING to inject an agent into the guest VM to collect
the performance data. The cloud administrator can conduct central management of the
implanting procedure to perform large-scale performance analysis.
2.3 System Overview
2.3.1 Security Requirements
For in-box approaches to detecting and neutralizing malware, the anti-malware security
tools are explicitly visible to the attacker. It is not difficult for the malware to identify the
process that belongs to the security tools. After identification, the most common attacking
technique of malware is to deactivate its opponent to prevent it from conducting scanning
and detecting.
In-box security tools typically run at the same privilege level as the malware. Thus
they have no advantage over the malware running within the same system. Even if they
can elevate to root, some malware can achieve the same privilege escalation by exploiting
some system vulnerability.
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The out-of-box approaches address the problem by relocating the security tools out to
the hypervisor to gain a higher-than-root privilege, but unfortunately at the same time they
lose the in-context semantic-rich view as a trade-off and need to rebuild the status of the
guest VM from byte-level information.
If we intend to implant the process back into the guest operating system, we need to
fulfill the security requirements to make sure that this implanted process is protected, hard
to be detected, and tamper-resistant to in-VM attacks. Otherwise, it has no advantage over
the traditional in-box approaches.
Considering the implanted process is still running upon the guest OS, nevertheless it has
some interactions with other components and relies on some services offered by the guest
OS. We do not want to add too many constraints on the coding standard for the implanted
process to make it totally isolated from the environment. The reason is that we want to
reuse existing security tools as implanted process with only minor modifications. Thus we
make a security assumption that the integrity of guest kernel is not in a compromised state
during implanting. The techniques like NICKLE [12] and HookSafe [13] can be leveraged
to maintain the kernel integrity when implanted process is running.
We state the security requirements from four aspects, stealthiness, isolation, robustness,
and completeness.
Stealthiness: The implanted process should be hard to be predicted and detected by
other processes in the guest VM.
Isolation: The implanted process should rely on as few services of guest OS as possible.
Also it should have as few interactions with other process as possible. This can reduce the
level of trustworthiness we demand on the guest OS and applications.
Robustness: The implanted process should not be terminated by other processes in the
guest VM when it is running.
Completeness: When the implanted process finishes running or the hypervisor needs to



























Figure 2.1.: Overall design of PROCESS-IMPLANTING framework
The key idea of PROCESS-IMPLANTING is to load the program from the hypervisor
into the guest VM and run it under the camouflage of a running in-VM victim process. The
administrator of the hypervisor can pick implanted process and victim process at runtime.
We allocate memory regions at the hypervisor level separately for different segments of the
implanted process. When the victim process is scheduled, we intercept the process context
switch and trap to the hypervisor. We save current CPU context and replace it with the
initial context of the implanted process, e.g., replace the instruction pointer with the entry
address of the implanted process’ binary and the stack pointer with the starting address
of the stack. Then we modify the page table entries of the victim process to redirect it
to the memory space where the implanted process is loaded. After re-entering the VM to
continue the process context switch, the program counter returns back to the user space and
begins to execute the code of the implanted process. When the implanted process finishes
its task or the hypervisor needs to enforce mandatory restoration for the victim process, we
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recover the victim process by restoring its saved context. Then the victim process could
restart its execution from the checkpoint. From the view of the victim process, it freezes
for a specific time window and some of its time slices are “borrowed” by the implanted
process. Figure 2.1 gives an illustration of the overall design.
The challenges of this approach come from the needs to satisfy the security require-
ments proposed by us. We demonstrate the detailed design choices to fulfill these security
requirements.
Random Selection of Victim Process
The static nature of traditional anti-malware software makes it easy to be targeted. The
attacker can identify its existence by reading the software configuration from the OS. In
order to be more stealthy, the administrator of hypervisor can randomly select the victim
process and restart the implanted process by choosing another victim process at runtime.
Such randomness eliminates the possibility that malware can locate its opponent only by
querying the system.
Single Virtual CPU When Implanted Process is Running
If a guest VM owns multiple virtual CPUs, the implanted process running on one VCPU
could be detected by a process running on another VCPU in parallel. In order to minimize
the chance of being detected as an implanted process, we could disable other VCPUs tem-
porarily when implanted process is running.
Camouflage of Implanted Process
The implanted process reuses the victim process’ kernel-level data structures, e.g., pro-
cess descriptor, page table, and heap, within the guest OS. From the view of the guest OS,
it cannot identify the difference from the normal execution of the victim process. The im-
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planted process just “borrow” a number of time slices from the victim process to run its
own program and restore the victim process’ execution state later.
In addition, implanted process is not backed by any file-based binary in the guest VM. If
the malware tends to perform binary analysis on the executable, it can only find the binary
of the victim process rather than the implanted process.
It can satisfy the security requirements of stealthiness with the camouflage of the victim
process. Forking a new process is not permitted during the execution of the implanted
process as it may leave obvious fingerprints, e.g., one more running process, in the guest
VM. This could violate the stealthiness requirement.
Self-contained Executable of the Implanted Process
When compiling the implanted process executable, we choose to link the library rou-
tines statically to make it self-contained. Although it increases the size of the binary image,
the implanted process does not need to rely on the library functions offered by the guest
system. Otherwise, if the libraries in the guest VM are compromised, the results gener-
ated by the implanted process cannot be fully trusted. Then the assumptions of trust level
have to be expanded. With such self-contained binary image, we only need to make an
assumption that the operating system services used by the implanted process are trusted.
This satisfies the security requirement of isolation.
Invisible Memory Space
We allocate three memory regions (code, data, and stack segment) for the implanted
process. These memory regions are located at the hypervisor level and are beyond the
physical memory range of the guest VM. The guest VM only checks the physical memory
size at its booting time and indexes it into its kernel data structure of memory pages. Adding
more memory to the guest VM during its runtime is similar to hot-plugging memory into a
memory slot. The guest VM has no knowledge of the newly registered memory regions and
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it does not access the memory address beyond its physical memory size. This satisfies the
security requirement of stealthiness because of the transparency of these memory regions.
Timing of Implanting
The timing of implanting is critical to our system in order to satisfy the security re-
quirement of completeness. From the view of guest system, the execution of victim process
freezes when the implantation happens. Remember we choose to implant the process in
the event of context switch and the next scheduled process is the victim process. However,
as a side effect, part of the execution in the kernel space for victim process is lost. The
reason is that when it enters back to the user space, the implanted process substitutes the
victim process to execute. Considering that, we make three design decisions to address this
problem. We first check if this context switch is triggered by the system call from the victim
process. When we restore the victim process after the implanted process exits, we set the
instruction pointer on the kernel stack backwards to restart this system call. Secondly, If
the victim process is waiting for the resources and has already set its state as uninterrupt-
ible, we will enter the virtual machine silently without implanting. Thirdly, if this context
switch is caused by a kernel preemption, we choose not to implant at this time.
Frequent Scene Restoration
We only permit the implanted process to read, write, and execute on its own memory
regions and the other process should not have access to it. Information leakage should be
prevented in the situation that the malware is capable of scanning the page table to detect the
modification. We design a mechanism called Frequent Scene Restoration (FSR), to recover
all the states we modified during implanting when the implanted process is scheduled out.
After the context switch, the victim process is not modified from the guest view. Although it
may incur some performance overhead, it satisfies the security requirement of stealthiness.
16
Checkpoint/Restart
Checkpoint/Restart is an optional design for some specific implanted process. As the
user stack of implanted process is allocated independently, we can checkpoint the execu-
tion status by recording the register status. The implanted process can restart from this
checkpoint and continue its execution at a later time when we want to implant it again.
This is also designed to fulfill the security requirement of stealthiness.
Coordination Between the Implanted Process and the Hypervisor
The coordination mechanism between the implanted process and the hypervisor is de-
signed for solving the concrete problem encountered when implanting some specific pro-
cess. For example, the tracing program like ltrace and strace could attach to a running
process and monitor its behavior. If we plan to execute mandatory restoration of victim
process, it could make the process being traced behave incorrectly because the tracer has
not detached from it. A similar problem arises for implanting a multi-threaded program. If
all the child threads spawned by the implanted process are still running when the mandatory
restoration happens, they could run on the address space of victim process after the restora-
tion and this may cause serious errors. We design a coordination mechanism between the
implanted process and the hypervisor to address these problems. A covert channel is cre-
ated by setting a control bit on the argument part of the user stack. It can be read by the
implanted process and written by the hypervisor. The implanted process should check it
periodically. Instead of restoring the victim process immediately, the hypervisor sets this
control bit to notify the implanted process that it could exit. When the implanted process
read this bit, it should clean up, e.g., let all the child threads exit or detach from the process
being traced, and then exit. The exit operation is intercepted by the hypervisor and we will
discuss it in the next paragraph of Graceful Exiting.
The other coordination mechanism is that we modify the source code of existing tools
to let them send the string pointer through hypercalls to the hypervisor instead of printing
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on the console within the guest VM. The hypervisor can read this string by translating the
guest virtual address to the host virtual address.
These coordination mechanisms promise the security requirements for completeness
and stealthiness.
Graceful Exiting
When the implanted process is exiting, the guest OS will free the memory space of
the implanted process we allocated at the hypervisor, and this will lead to a crash since
the physical address of that memory space exceeds the maximum physical memory that
the guest VM could access. This will break our security requirements of stealthiness and
completeness and is undesirable. So instead of letting the process complete its exiting,
we pause the exiting attempt and restore the victim process to maintain stealthiness and
completeness. To perform the interception and restoration, the hypervisor needs to know
exactly when the implanted process is going to exit. Although it is possible to modify the
source code of the implanted program to let it inform the hypervisor actively, that would be
inconvenient and not applicable to closed-source programs. Instead, we choose to set a trap
through debug register for the exiting event of the implanted process, and the hypervisor is
notified as soon as the trap is triggered.
Protection from the Hypervisor
The implanted process is not alone in the guest VM and is backed by the hypervisor.
We can add protection to the implanted process from the hypervisor to satisfy the security
requirement of robustness. Two mechanisms are designed in PROCESS-IMPLANTING to
achieve this goal. First we elevate the privilege level to root by modifying the credential
entry in the process descriptor. This has the same effect of switching user to root in the
guest VM. With root privilege, the user-level malware is not capable to kill it by merely
sending the terminating signal. It is also useful for some application scenarios because
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monitoring or patching operations can only be done with the highest privilege in the guest
VM.
If the malware also possess the same root privilege, it is still able to kill the implanted
process. In order to strengthen its robustness, we design the second mechanism for more
protection. We set the unkillable flag for this process and check its status for every context
switch. The unkillable flag is used only by the init process in Linux to prevent it from being
killed in any situation. We also utilize it to make our implanted process unkillable. If this
bit is cleared by other process, we check it during every context switch to make sure that it
has been set before running the implanted process.
Special Case: Multi-thread Program Implanting
Multi-threading is a widely-used programming paradigm nowadays and PROCESS-
IMPLANTING supports multi-threaded applications to be practical in real-world scenarios.
However, it needs special care for both selecting a multi-thread victim process and implant-
ing a multi-threaded program.
To illustrate this problem, let us first take a close look at the scene of selecting a multi-
thread victim process. When implanting happens, we choose a thread of the victim process
to execute the implanted process. We denote this specific thread as victim thread, and
other threads of the victim process as innocent threads. We modify the address space and
the execution context of the victim thread to provide an execution environment for the
implanted process. Note that such modification to the address space is shared among all
threads of the victim process, but the modification to the execution context is only done to
the victim thread. When those innocent threads begin to execute, inconsistency between
the address space and their execution contexts may lead to a crash. There are two ways to
address this problem, either by freezing all innocent threads, or by restoring the address
space when there is a context switch to a innocent thread. We choose the latter one because
it is more stealthy and easier to implement.
19
Algorithm 1 Multi-thread program implanting handling on context switch
1: procedure MULTITHREADIMPLANT(next)
2: if next = victim and next.pid = next.tgid and imp = FALSE then
3: IMPLANT()
4: imp← TRUE
5: maxpid← GET MAXPID IN GROUP(next)
6: vicpid← next.pid
7: else if imp = TRUE then
8: ptype← OTHER
9: ntype← OTHER
10: if prev.tgid = vicpid then
11: if prev.pid = prev.tgid then
12: ptype← VICTIM




17: if next.tgid = vicpid then
18: if next.pid = next.tgid then
19: ntype← VICTIM




24: if (ptype = VICTIM or ptype = IMPNEW) and (ntype = INNOCENT or ntype = OTHER) then
25: RESTORE SCENE()
26: else if (ptype = INNOCENT or ptype = OTHER) and (ntype = VICTIM or ntype = IMPNEW) then
27: LOAD SCENE()
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Implanting a multi-threaded program makes the scene more complex. The threads cre-
ated by the implanted process require the address space for the implanted process while
innocent threads of the victim process require the original address space of the victim pro-
cess, so we have to switch address space when context switch happens between these two
kinds of threads. However, there is no simple way to differentiate between these two kinds
of threads because they belong to the same thread group. We use a technique here by lever-
aging the fact that if no innocent thread is created after implanting, then any thread created
by the implanted process should have greater pid than any of the innocent threads (assum-
ing the pid is in the same order of process creation time). Note that most programs only
create threads in their main threads, so if we choose the main thread as the victim thread,
the condition of the above fact is naturally fulfilled. In this way we could find the maxi-
mum pid of innocent threads before implanting and use it as a boundary between the two
kinds of threads. Algorithm 1 demonstrates the detailed procedures we develop to handle
multi-threaded program in PROCESS-IMPLANTING. We denote the previous task as prev,
next task as next, type of previous task as ptype, type of next task type as ntype, vic-
tim thread’s pid as vicpid, process implanted flag imp and maximum pid in victim thread
group asmaxpid.
2.4 Implementation
Figure 2.2.: Workflow of PROCESS-IMPLANTING
We have implemented a proof-of-concept PROCESS-IMPLANTING component as an
extension of Kernel-based Virtual Machine [14] (KVM) hypervisor leveraging the Intel
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virtualization technology [15]. The host OS is Ubuntu 10.04 32bit (Linux Kernel 2.6.32-23)
distribution and the guest OS is Ubuntu 9.10 32bit (Linux Kernel 2.6.31-14) distribution.
The workflow can be divided into five phases: initialization, camouflage, implanting,
checkpointing, and exit, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The dotted line for the checkpointing
phase means that it is optional. We explain each phase in detail below:
2.4.1 Initialization Phase
We choose Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) as the file format for the implanted
process image. The binary image is compiled beforehand by statically linking all the li-
brary routines to make it self-contained. A program loader is implemented to load the
code/data/stack segments into the memory allocated at the hypervisor level.
Then we register the memory slots in KVM for these three memory segments and assign
them the guest physical addresses which are beyond the boundary of existing memory size
of the guest VM. These memory segments are transparent to the guest OS as it has no
knowledge that they are “hot-plugged” into the slots during the runtime and the guest VM
only calculates the memory pages at its booting time. Only the implanted process can
access these parts of memory in the following phases.
2.4.2 Camouflage Phase
In the camouflage phase, the victim process name can be determined at runtime. The
name is written in the victim process configuration file, which is read by the hypervisor
periodically. The guest virtual addresses of all exported kernel functions can be read from
the system map of the guest kernel. switch to is the function responsible for process
context switch in the Linux Kernel. After finding its entry address by searching the system
map, we set debug register at this address in the guest kernel. Thus every context switch
causes debug exception and can be captured by the hypervisor.
In our previous design, we considered the setting of a new cr3 register as the symbol of
context switch. This cannot fulfill the security requirements because if the thread scheduled
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after the implanted process is a kernel thread or a user thread in the same thread group,
it may reuse the previous cr3 and no VM exit happens. If the subsequent thread is a user
thread, it may crash because it would run on a wrong address space. If this thread is a
kernel thread and is malicious, it could scan the page table of the previous thread to dump
the code and data segment of the implanted process.
With VM exits intercepted at every context switch, if the previous thread is implanted
process, we can restore both the page table and the modified entries in process descriptor
before the execution of the next thread. Before implanting, we need to fill the upper part
of the user stack by copying the content from the victim process’ user stack. These are
arguments, environments, and the auxiliary array, which are read by the implanted process
during its loading time.
2.4.3 Implanting Phase
If the context switch happens and victim process is the next thread to be scheduled, VM
traps to the hypervisor. All the user registers for the victim process are stored on the kernel
stack. The steps of implanting are:
(i) Save user registers
(ii) Save the memory region descriptor’s list
(iii) Save the original affected address mapping
(iv) Adjust physical page table of the victim process to point to implant process’ memory
space
(v) Update related entries in the shadow page table
(vi) Adjust the memory region descriptor’s list to adapt to the new address space
(vii) Set user registers with the value of the implanted process
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After completing seven steps above, when the guest VM resumes to guest mode, the victim
process is completely replaced with the implanted process. The procedure of switching to
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Figure 2.3.: Address space of implanted process
After implanting for the first time, when the implanted process is scheduled out, we
restore victim process’ physical page table and memory region descriptor list as mentioned
in the design section about FSR. If the implanted process is scheduled again, we load the




Checkpointing phase is optional and its main purpose is to raise the bar of stealthiness.
The implanted process can be paused at a specific time by saving its execution state, i.e.,
user registers, the memory region descriptor list, and restore the execution of the victim
process. The implanted process can restart at the checkpoint and continue execution after
the victim process runs for several time slices.
2.4.5 Exit Phase
When the implanted process attempts to exit, we need to restore the victim process. The
hypervisor intercepts the exiting attempt by setting traps on two system calls, sys exit and
sys exit group. All user mode processes in the Linux invoke either of these two system calls
when they exit. We set two debug registers to the entry addresses of these two system calls.
Such that any call or jump to them triggers a VM exit and can be captured by the hypervisor.
When the hypervisor intercepts an exiting event and finds that the exiting process is the
implanted process, it restores the victim process. Note that restoration here is slightly
different from what we do in the checkpointing phase. In the checkpointing phase, the user
mode registers saved in the kernel stack are restored directly when the kernel returns to the
user mode. However, in the exit phase, the user mode EAX register is set to the return value
of the sys exit or sys exit group system call by the kernel. This is unexpected since the call
was invoked by the implanted process but not the victim process, and the user mode EAX
register of the victim process should not be tampered. To solve the problem, we set the
kernel mode EAX register, which is used to store the return value of the system call, to the
same value as the user mode EAX register of the victim process. In this way the user mode
EAX register of the victim process would remain unmodified even if it is set to the return
value of the system call. In addition, because the sys exit or sys exit group function should
not be actually executed, we set the instruction pointer and the stack pointer to the frame of
the function’s caller. From a user’s view, the function returns without executing its code.
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2.5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our PROCESS-IMPLANTING component in three aspects.
First, we show how our system satisfy the security requirements. Then we present some
active introspection application cases. Finally we give the performance measurement re-
sults.
2.5.1 Security Evaluation
Experiment I: Scan the page table of the victim processm
Figure 2.4.: Scan the page table of victim process
To demonstrate that even if the guest kernel is trusted, our mechanism of FSR is still
crucial and necessary to maintain the stealthiness of the implanted process, we imple-
mented a userspace program to simulate the potential attack by scanning the page table of
the victim process repeatedly. Since Linux Kernel 2.6.25, there is a new feature that allows
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userspace programs to read page tables of other processes by scanning /proc/pid/pagemap.
We assume that the attacker knows the design of PROCESS-IMPLANTING, the details of
our implementation, and even the exact process chosen as the victim process.
The detection follows this observation: if a process is implanted, some of its virtual
addresses are mapped to physical pages exceeding the maximum physical memory allo-
cated for the virtual machine; for normal process, no such mapping exists. This is because
the memory used to store code, data, and stack segments of the implanted process is allo-
cated at the hypervisor level. Its memory address falls out of the border of the guest VM’s
memory. The scanner can claim that a process is implanted if it finds such suspicious page
mappings in the page table of that victim process.
We perform the experiment with FSR disabled and enabled respectively. The compari-
son of the two results is shown in Figure 2.4. When FSR is disabled, before the implanting,
the scanner found the original page mapping of the victim process as shown in the upper
box of the left window. Then, right after the implanting, changes made to the page table
and suspicious page mappings shown in the lower box of the left window are discovered.
On the contrary, when FSR is enabled, the attacker could only find the original page map-
pings of the victim process shown in the right window during the whole experiment. This
is because when the scanning process is running, the implanted process must have been
scheduled out at an earlier time and we have already recovered all the things we modified
during implanting at that time using FSR.
2.5.2 Active Introspection Case Studies
Ltrace is the tool to intercept and record the library/system calls and the signals of a
specific process. It can attach to a process and monitor its behavior during runtime. We
make two experiments to demonstrate using it as the implanted process.
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Experiment II: Implanting ltrace to trace malware
In this experiment, we implant ltrace into the guest VM and leverage it to trace both
the library and system calls of a real-world malware. The results are transferred to the
hypervisor through hypercalls.
The right window in Figure 2.5 presents the malware whose name is i-am-sick. Its main
function is to infect the files under the /tmp directory by copying code into it and execute
the infected file afterwards. With the implanted ltrace, we can attach to the malware at
runtime and monitor the library calls and system calls. The left window in Figure 2.5 is
the terminal of the KVM hypervisor. It receives logs directly from the implanted ltrace.
After inspecting the log in this terminal, the execution path and malicious behavior of this
malware can be easily identified.
Experiment III: Implanting ltrace to trace infected application
In this experiment, we implant ltrace to trace a ls application that is infected by caline.
Caline is an ELF infector using Segment Padding Infection (SPI) technique. It inserts virus
code after the code segment of ELF binary to change its behavior. Through tracing the
infected ls, we can easily identify the deviated execution path by checking the arguments
of library calls. The box in Figure 2.6 presents the suspicious execution results.
System events tracing is one of the most effective techniques of computer forensics
to collect evidence of malware and is also the weak point of VMI techniques, especially
in the era when hardware virtualization technology has been widely deployed. Traditional
methods used in QEMU-based [16] system to intercept system call cannot be used any more
because the system call instructions are not privileged instructions and would not cause
VM exit for hardware virtualization. The common technique now is to set a trap point
at the system call table entry address or set a page fault manually to cause the VM exit.
These methods introduce great performance degradation because VM entry and exit are
heavyweight operations [17]. Plus there is no introspection techniques now can track finer-
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Figure 2.5.: Implanting ltrace to trace malware
grained events, such as library function calls. PROCESS-IMPLANTING could efficiently
bridge this gap.
Experiment IV: Installing kernel module
A loadable kernel module is an object file to extend the capabilities of a running base
kernel. It is a flexible approach to supporting new file system, installing device driver, and
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Figure 2.6.: Trace the library call of infected application
adding new system calls. As we mentioned in the previous sections, in the cloud computing
environment, PROCESS-IMPLANTING is a feasible approach to installing kernel modules
into the guest OS. In this experiment, we compile a kernel module whose name is PI.ko.
Then we implant an agent which has the function to get the module from the hypervisor
through a TCP channel and insert it into the guest OS. Because installing kernel module
requires root privilege, we elevate the privilege level of the implanted process to complete
this task. We have taken a screenshot to demonstrate the result. In Figure 2.7, there are
two terminals named “Before implanting” and “After implanting”. Before implanting, we
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Figure 2.7.: Installing kernel module and adjusting system parameters
use the lsmod command to list all the installed kernel modules, there is no module named
PI printed out in the terminal. After implanting, we run lsmod again and the PI kernel
module has been installed on it. Please look at the first red box in the window of “After
implanting”.
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Experiment V: Reading system information and adjusting system parameter
In order to demonstrate the application scenario for cloud computing to monitor and
adjust the performance of running guest OS, we design this experiment to give some impli-
cation. In this experiment, we implant an agent into the guest VM and execute several test
cases.
• Test case 1: Issue the instruction of cpuid to detect the type of the hypervisor.
• Test case 2: Test the instruction of rdtsc to read the CPU clock rate.
• Test case 3: Write value into drop cache entry in the /proc file system. After writing
this value into the entry, the guest OS drops the page, inode, and dentry cache to free
the memory.
The effects of implanted process can be seen in Figure 2.7. In the blue box, it is the ter-
minal to run the KVM hypervisor on the host. We can see that the information is printed on
the screen through the hypercalls of the implanted process. In the green box of Figure 2.7,
the value for the entry /proc/sys/vm/drop caches is 0. In the red box of the terminal of “Af-
ter implanting”, the value is 5 instead. We can compare the free memory in these terminals.
In the “Before implanting” terminal, the free memory is 443272 KB. In the “After implant-
ing” terminal, the free memory is 660740 KB. Buffers and caches are released through this
method. Reading and adjusting value from /proc cannot be achieved by traditional intro-
spection approach because files in /proc are memory-based and callback function handlers
are only triggered in the event of /proc reading or writing operations.
This capability can greatly simplify the procedures of performance debugging in the
large-scale cloud computing environment. Implanted process can act as an agent to collect
the performance data. Compared with these methods that only rely on statistical inference,
the data directly from the guest system is more intuitive for performance diagnosis.
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2.5.3 Performance Measurements
Our testing platform is Dell Optiplex 755 with Intel R© CoreTM2 Quad Q6600 2.40GHz
CPU and 3GB memory. We allocate 1GB memory to the guest VM. The performance of
implanted process is measured in three scenarios:
Implanting Disabled
In this scenario, all the capabilities of PROCESS-IMPLANTING are disabled. It is used
as the baseline for performance measurement.
Implanting Enabled
The function of PROCESS-IMPLANTING is enabled in this scenario. But we still disable
the feature of FSR which is used to enhance the security by restoring the execution scene
when the implanted process is scheduled out.
Enable Both Implanting and FSR
The FSR is enabled along with implanting in this scenario to measure the performance
overhead that is introduced by this feature.
We implement a program as a micro-benchmark to test the performance. Its main func-
tion is to read and write the entries in the /proc file system, allocate/free memory. This
program runs for 1000 times to get the average running time. Three different kinds of ap-
plications in guest operating system are used as victim processes, gnome-power-manager,
vmstat, and gimp.
Gnome-power-manager is a session daemon to manage the power for the laptop or
desktop. It is a good candidate for the victim process because it is scheduled periodically
to check the status of the battery and the AC power. Vmstat is a command-line tool to
report the virtual memory statistics. It has no interaction with the user. Gimp is an image
















































Figure 2.8.: Performance comparison of implanted process
the performance results of this micro-benchmark. The y axis is the average time to run
micro-benchmark for one time. If we only enable the implanting without FSR, it introduce
43.4% 55.6% and 15.4% performance overhead separately for these three victim processes
comparing with running the process directly on the guest operating system. With FSR en-
abled, the performance overhead increases by 24.1%, 51.6% ,and 97% comparing with the
system with only implanting enabled. The performance overhead comes from two sources.
The first one is introduced by the VMI. Debug register is set at the entry address of context
switch function of the guest kernel. Virtual machine exits when there is a process sched-
uled to run. The other source of performance overhead is from the FSR. FSR will restore
the execution scenario of victim process to eliminate the possibility for other processes to
detect the occurrence of implanting. The effectiveness of FSR has been demonstrated in the
experiment I. In FSR, the memory region list is restored every time when there is context
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switch. It may introduce more overhead if the victim process itself is more complex. When
the victim process is gimp, we can see from Figure 2.8 that the running time jumps by 97%
after FSR is enabled. It is reasonable because gimp is a more complex software than vmstat
and gnome-power-manager.
We need to point it out that the performance overhead is only at the time of implanting.
PROCESS-IMPLANTING is designed to be modular and decoupled with other functionalities
of KVM hypervisor. The implanting capability can be turn off easily without impacting
other components in the hypervisor. When the implanted process exits, the function of
implanting can be disabled by removing the breakpoints set by the debug registers and the
system can recover to its original performance level.
2.6 Summary
PROCESS-IMPLANTING is a general-purpose active introspection component in our
hypervisor-based security framework. It creates a channel to implant a process from hy-
pervisor into a guest VM and run it under the cover of an existing process. Through the
coordination and protection from the hypervisor, the implanted process can achieve strong
tamper-resistance and stealthiness in the guest VM. We also propose a series of application
scenarios in the areas of both security and cloud VM management, and demonstrate the
feasibility and effectiveness of PROCESS-IMPLANTING in our evaluation.
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3 DRIP: DRIVER PURIFICATION COMPONENT
3.1 Problem Statement
In state-of-the-art design of commodity operating systems, drivers usually take the form
of loadable kernel extensions. Privileged users could load them dynamically to support new
devices or extend functionalities of a base kernel at runtime. They hide the complexity of
interacting with hardware devices and present a neat abstract interface for other kernel
components. To achieve these properties, drivers execute with the same privilege as the
OS kernel, which makes them susceptible targets of malicious attacks. Unlike the kernel,
which is either built by trusted companies or with source code opened to the public, kernel
drivers could be provided by third-party vendors as a binary blob.
Given a binary driver, it is difficult to tell whether malicious logic is embedded inside
it. From customers’ perspectives, it may work correctly with no suspicious symptoms, but
the embedded malicious code [18,19] may have already collected confidential information
and cloaked its fingerprint under the cover of a legitimate driver. Even if we assume that
vendors only perform the functionalities as they claim, there still exist many binary driver
infection techniques [20–25] that could implant malicious logic into benign drivers and
transform them into trojaned drivers. When the trojaned driver is loaded into an operating
system, the hidden malicious code can be loaded simultaneously with the benign code.
Hence the challenge is: how can we identify malicious/undesirable logic in the driver and
eliminate it at binary level without impairing driver’s normal operations?
Existing research efforts to protect device drivers can be divided into two categories,
online monitoring and offline profiling. Online approaches [26–29] were proposed to iso-
late the driver in a protection domain and enforce external runtime checks on its execution.
They either cannot target intentionally malicious drivers or require protection from the un-
derlying hypervisor. All of them add non-trivial performance overhead due to the realtime
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monitoring. Offline approaches [30, 31] are designed to exercise the driver during testing
to find bugs and vulnerabilities, but they are still incapable of distilling benign operations
and eliminating malicious behaviors in the driver.
We develop a security component called DRIP in our active protection framework to
address this problem from a different angle. Based on our observation, we find that ma-
licious/undesirable logic embedded inside many trojaned kernel drivers is orthogonal to
drivers’ normal functionalities and most such logic achieves malicious effects through in-
teracting with the base kernel through kernel API invocations. Removing these interactions
in malicious code will not affect the correct execution of the driver and it can also neu-
tralize the malicious behavior. We leverage test suites for the semantic-level behavior of
applications [32–34] in order to ensure that the driver works correctly when used by those
applications. By testing the different application level behaviors, we simultaneously test
and ensure all of the underlying benign driver functionality that applications use.
We record interactions between a subject driver and the kernel during testing. Then we
try to select and remove a subset of driver-kernel interactions to test whether this removal
operation will violate the correct execution of the test suite. We iterate this testing process
until all unnecessary interactions are removed, and consequently we can generate a purified
driver with malicious/undesirable behaviors removed.
DRIP has following contributions:
• A testing approach for differentiating between benign and malicious logic of a tro-
janed driver. DRIP only requires a high-level test suite to cover and retain core legit-
imate functionalities of the driver.
• A Test-and-Reduce algorithm to incrementally reduce unnecessary kernel-driver in-
teractions and extract a minimal subset to ensure the correct execution of the driver.
• A clustering mechanism to group kernel-driver interactions according to current ex-
ecution context. It provides additional semantic information to speed up the removal
of kernel API invocations in the Test-and-Reduce algorithm.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the motivation
and overview of the DRIP component. Section 3.3 provides the detailed design of DRIP.
Section 3.4 gives functional studies of some representative cases and evaluates the perfor-
mance. We summarize DRIP in Section 3.5.
3.2 System Overview
3.2.1 Goals and Assumptions
The goal of DRIP is to purify a device driver with malicious/undesirable logic embed-
ded that may jeopardize the base kernel. The newly generated driver should have the benign
functionalities of a vanilla driver with malicious effects eliminated.
Our approach is based on the assumption that the trojaned driver includes the function-
alities of a benign driver. The malicious logic is parasitically attached to the benign logic
within the driver’s binary and executes persistently when the driver is loaded. We do not tar-
get time-bomb malware in which the malicious functions can only be triggered at a specific
time because the malicious logic may not be active during our testing. This problem can
be addressed by using symbolic execution [35] to cover more execution paths. There are
some existing efforts [31, 36, 37] to apply symbolic execution to driver testing and we can
leverage them to complement our work. In addition, we do not target the malicious code
that interacts with kernel through direct memory manipulation. We could consider kernel
memory accesses as part of driver-kernel interactions and plan to include this feature in our
future work.
We assume that a test suite is available that covers the high-level behaviors of a spe-
cific application. As previously mentioned, testing those behaviors also means that the test
suite covers the necessary driver functionality that they depend upon. Because we test the
application level behaviors, our technique ensures that the application continues to behave
correctly with the purified driver. This assumption is reasonable for current software de-
velopment processes, in which developers often create test cases from requirements even
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before implementation as part of the design phase. We can also leverage existing test gen-
eration techniques [35, 37, 38] to automatically synthesize test cases.
3.2.2 Approach Overview
For a particular application and the environment in which it executes, we need to en-
sure that the application continues to behave correctly. This includes correctly executing
any low-level behaviors in the driver that the application relies upon and triggers during
its operation. We can do this by treating the driver like a blackbox, without considering
the specifics of its implementation. For example, we might examine a network interface
controller (NIC) driver. We can cover the functionality of an FTP server through test cases
from curl-loader [34]. If we can ensure the correct execution of curl-loader when using
a purified NIC driver, then we have empirically preserved the functionalities of the driver
needed by curl-loader. In general, covering the tests of an application will also cover and
preserve the low level driver functionality necessary for that application.
Based on our experience of analyzing conventional rootkits, we gain the insight that
the common goals of malicious code in kernel space are to retrieve information from base
kernel and manipulate kernel data to hide footprints of user space malware. It is difficult to
generate a completely self-contained malicious module to achieve all these effects without
invoking kernel APIs. When we face a trojaned kernel driver, the execution of malicious
code is mixed with the execution of benign code at runtime. Benign code of the driver will
also invoke kernel APIs to request services from base kernel. So we need to differentiate
benign kernel API invocations from malicious ones. With the availability of a test suite
covering benign functionalities of the driver, we can iteratively eliminate some of the kernel
API invocations at runtime to test whether it will violate the correct execution of the test
suite. If the removal will not affect the benign behavior, we consider these invocations
unnecessary; therefore, they can be removed from the binary.
Based on this observation, we first take a snapshot of the system and execute the test
suite from a deterministic state. We record all kernel API invocations from the driver to the
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kernel during testing, which can be captured as control flow transitions across the bound-
ary of driver’s loading memory region. Then we try to restore to the snapshot, remove a
subset of these invocations in memory, and re-execute the same test suite to test whether
the removal will affect its correct execution. We chop the removal set of invocations itera-
tively until all the invocations left are critical to the correct execution of the driver. Because
benign functionalities of the driver are covered by the test suite, the removal of kernel API
invocations within benign code will fail the test suite, so we consider them critical and
preserve them. On the other hand, because malicious code embedded is either orthogo-
nal or complementary to core functionalities of its “host” driver, removal of invocations
within malicious code will not violate the correct execution of the test suite, thus they are
considered unnecessary. Finally we can generate a purified driver with all the unnecessary
invocations removed; therefore, the malicious effects from driver are eliminated concomi-
tantly.
3.2.3 Procedure Overview
Figure 3.1 depicts the overall workflow of DRIP to demonstrate how to purify a tro-
janed driver. We divide the whole procedure into three phases, i.e., profiling, testing, and
rewriting, as in Figure 3.1(a). These three phases are transparent to each other. We give
a brief description of the specific functionality of each phase first and will elaborate upon
them in the following section.
Before starting the purifying process, we construct the Testing Environment in Fig-
ure 3.1(b) and prepare the binary file of the trojaned driver. In the profiling phase, we
execute the test suite to trigger the execution of this driver, record kernel API invocations,
and cluster them according to their execution context. The output of this phase is the Profil-
ing Data and it is organized in the structure presented in Figure 3.1(c). In the testing phase,
we select and remove a subset of these kernel API invocations and test their influence on
the correct execution of the test suite. The Testing Data shares the same structure as the
Profiling Data. The only difference is that we mark testing status on every entry in the Test-
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Figure 3.1.: Workflow of DRIP
ing Data. For example, in Figure 3.1(c), shaded entries in Testing Data indicate that they
have been tested. We feed the Intermediate Testing Data back as input to the testing phase.
The testing phase terminates when all the entries in the Testing Data have been tested. In
the last rewriting phase, we summarize the testing result, apply the changes on the trojaned
binary, and generate a purified driver.
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3.3 Detailed Design
In this section, we describe DRIP following the workflow of the driver purification
procedure and discuss the key design DRIP component in detail. First, we describe the
setup of the Testing Environment. Then we demonstrate the profiling, testing, and rewriting
phases respectively to explain the procedure of generating a purified driver. Finally, we
present the technical details of the prototype implementation.
3.3.1 Environment Setup
Before the purification procedure, we set up the Testing Environment, prepare the tro-
janed driver, and design a communication channel to send test results from the test suite to
DRIP.
Testing Environment
As shown in Figure 3.1(b), the Testing Environment consists of a guest VM and its
underlying emulator (we use QEMU [16] in our environment) as the analysis platform. We
integrate our DRIP as a component into the emulator. In the guest VM, we load the trojaned
driver in the kernel space and monitor the code execution within its loading memory region.
We select or synthesize an automated test suite for the target application to cover the benign
behavior of the subject driver and launch it in the user space. In order to ensure that the test
suite executes from a deterministic state, we take a snapshot of the VM at the time right
before the test suite is about to run.
Communication Channel
If we pick up an existing test suite, it would have no knowledge about the underlying
system including DRIP. However DRIP needs to make decisions based on the current
status of the test suite. So we design a communication channel between the test suite and
DRIP. We can leverage special instructions like hypercall or cpuid, to send signals to the
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underlying emulator. The emulator can extract signals when translating these instructions.
We design three signals, TESTON, TESTSUCC, and TESTFAIL, which respectively stand
for the beginning of the test, the end of the test with a successful result, and the end of the
test with a failing result. Then we embed the communication channel in the test suite to
send these signals at their corresponding events.
3.3.2 Profiling Phase
In the profiling phase, we record all kernel API invocations/returns during the execution
of the test suite. Because all recorded invocations in different process contexts are mixed,
we design a technique called Context-Sensitive Clustering to de-interleave invocations into
clusters and label each cluster with FuncEntry tag. After the recording and clustering
of invocations, we organize the runtime information captured into the Profiling Data and
transfer it to the next testing phase.
Tracking of Driver-Kernel Interactions
Because QEMU can translate every instruction in the guest VM, we track the execution
of the driver through monitoring its program counter at the granularity of a basic block.
If the current basic block is within the driver’s memory region and the previous one is
located outside, it means that control flow transits from the kernel into the driver. If the
previous basic block is within the driver’s region and the address of the current one is out
of the driver’s boundary, it indicates that the control flow transits from the driver into the
kernel. Then all control flow transitions passing the driver boundary can be recorded. The
transitions between kernel and driver are either in the form of a call/jump instruction or a
ret instruction.
As mentioned earlier, we prepare a test suite for the subject device driver we want to
test. When the test suite begins to execute, we issue TESTON to notify DRIP of the start of
the test. When the test finishes successfully or terminates due to an assertion failure, it also
notifies our system with the result through TESTSUCC/TESTFAIL respectively. We denote
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it as one Testing Cycle from the beginning of a test to the end. We record all the transitions
that are issued through call/jump instructions from the driver to the kernel in one Testing
Cycle and we treat them as kernel API invocations.
After recording kernel API invocations from the driver to the kernel, we need to capture
the return value of each invocation because it may be used by subsequent instructions. We
record the transitions that are issued through the ret instruction from the kernel to the driver
and we treat them as kernel API returns. The return value is stored in a general register,
e.g., EAX under x86. Some kernel APIs are void functions or the return values are not used
any further. We check the def-use of EAX in subsequent instructions to determine whether
the return value is used or not. If EAX is defined first, it indicates that the return value is
not used and has no effect on later instructions. If EAX is used first, we need to record this
value and map it to the function invocations recorded before.
Due to multitasking in the OS, a kernel driver’s code can be executed concurrently in
different process contexts. Most OSes also enable the features of kernel reentrancy and
kernel preemption, which mean all processes can be interrupted in the kernel mode and
resumed from a previous checkpoint when the interrupt is handled. These properties make
it complicated to create one-to-one mapping from the kernel API return to its invocation.
Fortunately, the starting address of the kernel stack for different processes/threads is differ-
ent and can be used to uniquely identify the process context. We leverage this property to
identify the current context of the driver code being executed. Processes may be interrupted
to handle hardware interruptions and nested interrupts are possible. It conforms to the Last
In First Out (LIFO) order in the same process context. We maintain a call stack for every
active process to record the last function invocation and its expected return address. When
a function returns, we can find the call stack according to the current process context and
map the return value to the last function invocation stored in this call stack and pop it.
We give a simplified example in Figure 3.2. We assume processes 1 and 2 are running
simultaneously in the system and both request the same service of the kernel driver (dotted
red paths 1 and 4 for process 1 and dotted blue paths 2 and 3 for process 2). For the
execution of driver’s code in Process 1’s context, it invokes API 1 (solid red path 6) of the
44
Figure 3.2.: Function return value mapping
kernel and is interrupted before returning from API 1. Then it calls API 2 (solid red path
8) in the handler of interrupt 1. Before returning from API 2, the call stack of Process
1 contains both API 1 and API 2. When returning from API 2 (dashed red path 10), the
current process context is Process 1 and it can map the return to API 2 in Process 1’s call
stack and pop API 2 from call stack. For the execution in Process 2’s context, both API 2
and API 3 in two interrupt handlers have returned (dashed blue path 9 and 12) and popped
from the call stack. There is only API 1 in the call stack. When API 1 returns from the
kernel (dashed blue path 13), its current process context is Process 2 and then we can map
the return value to API 1 and pop it from the call stack.
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Figure 3.3.: Context-sensitive clustering
Context-Sensitive Clustering
After recording all kernel API invocations in one Testing Cycle linearly, we find that
invocations in different process contexts may interleave with each other due to multitask-
ing and kernel preemption. In Figure 3.3(a), we present recorded invocations of a trojaned
E1000 NIC driver. It is compromised by the module injection technique [22] and the pay-
load is a DR rootkit. Each entry contains a symbol name (just used for clear demonstration,
symbols of the driver are not needed by DRIP), funcaddr, and apiaddr. Funcaddr is the
function invocation’s call site address in the driver and apiaddr is the API’s entry address
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in the core kernel. Interleaved invocations make it difficult to design an efficient removal
strategy in the following phase because there is no information of connections among in-
vocations.
We design a technique called Context-Sensitive Clustering to de-interleave kernel API
invocations recorded during the profiling phase. It is based on the observation that, for
the trojaned driver, each function in the driver either belongs to the benign logic or to the
malicious logic and we can group kernel API invocations issued under the same function
together. Thus after clustering according to each function address in the driver, interleaved
kernel API invocations belonging to benign/malicious logic are naturally separated and
become easier to process in the next phase.
In Figure 3.3(b), we present the result after applying Context-Sensitive Clustering and
organize the kernel API invocations in reverse chronological order. The entries in red are
function invocations from the DR rootkit and those in blue are from the E1000 NIC driver.
We denote the group clustered as a Context Group and present one specific example in the
red rectangle. This Context Group is headed with hook execve entry addr:0xf81f08b0 and
it contains three function invocations, ptregs execve, strstr and getname. It means during
the execution of function hook execve whose entry address is 0xf81f08b0 in the driver, it
invokes these three kernel APIs. We combine the clustered kernel API invocations with the
return values to generate the Profiling Data and transfer to the testing phase.
3.3.3 Testing Phase
In the testing phase, DRIP eliminates kernel API invocations that do not affect the
correct execution of the test suite, which ensures the preservation of the driver’s benign
functionalities. We obtain the Profiling Data that contains clustered kernel API invocations
from the preceding profiling phase and rename it as Testing Data. Initially, entries in the
Testing Data are not marked with any status.
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1: procedure DISPATCH(signal) ⊲ Dispatch based on signal
2: if signal = TESTON then
3: PATCHTESTEDFUNCS()
4: PATCHCURRFUNCLIST()
5: else if signal = TESTSUCC then
6: MARKCURRFUNCLIST(UNNEC)
7: LOADSNAPSHOT() ⊲ Load Snapshot of VM
8: else if signal = TESTFAIL then




13: {FuncList 1, FuncList 2} ← SPLITLIST()




18: while ContextGroupIter 6= NULL do
19: if ContextGroupIter.status = TESTED or TESTING then
20: for all Func in ContextGroupIter.funclist do
21: if Func.status = UNNEC then
22: REMOVEFUNC(Func) ⊲ Remove the invocation in Memory
23: if ContextGroupIter.status = TESTING then
24: ASSERT(CurrFuncList 6= NULL)
25: return
26: if ContextGroupIter.status = UNTESTED then
27: CurrContextGroup← ContextGroupIter ⊲ Init CurrContextGroup





Algorithm 2 Test-and-Reduce algorithm in the testing phase (continued)
32: procedure PATCHCURRFUNCLIST(void)
33: for all Func in CurrFuncList do
34: REMOVEFUNC(Func)
35: procedure MARKCURRFUNCLIST(status) ⊲ Mark statuses in the CurrFuncList
36: if status = UNNEC then
37: for all Func in CurrFuncList do
38: Func.status← UNNEC









48: procedure RECOVERCURRFUNCLIST(void) ⊲ Recover CurrFuncList
49: for all Func in CurrFuncList do
50: RESTOREFUNC(Func) ⊲ Restore Invocation in Memory
When the Testing Cycle begins, we load the snapshot to execute the test suite from
a deterministic state. Upon receiving TESTON, a subset of kernel API invocations that
have not been marked will be selected and removed from the memory. As aforementioned,
we cluster kernel API invocations in the profiling phase into different Context Groups.
Selection of candidates for removal is based on the clustering. First we select one Context
Group that is marked as UNTESTED and try to remove all function invocations in it. Then
we change its status to TESTING. We maintain a FuncStack to record the current function
invocation list that is being tested. Then we enter the VM to resume executing the test
suite. If it runs to completion successfully, we mark the current kernel API invocations as
UNNEC, which means that they do not violate the correct execution of the test suite and
can be removed before the next Testing Cycle. If the removal causes failure of the test
suite, we utilize a divide and conquer approach to split the Context Group into two equal
subsets and push them into the FuncStack. Then we recover current invocations being
tested in memory and re-launch the next Testing Cycle. If the current set contains only one
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Figure 3.4.: Reverse chronological order
function invocation, which cannot be divided any further, we mark this function invocation
as CRITICAL if test fails. If all kernel API invocations in the same Context Group have
been tested, we mark this context group as TESTED and continue to process the next one.
We iterate this process until all kernel API invocations in the Testing Data are marked. The
detailed algorithm is presented in the Test-and-Reduce Algorithm 2.
Recall that we list every function invocation in the Context Group using reverse chrono-
logical order. The reason is that the result of earlier function invocations will probably im-
pact the later function invocations. But removing the later invocation first will not impact
the earlier ones. In Figure 3.4, we present the function h4x unlink from KBeast, which is
one of the malicious payloads in our evaluation. h4x unlink is used to hijack the sys unlink
system call from Linux. It analyzes the pathname argument and protects its own malicious
files from being deleted. We highlight 3 function invocations in blue, which are kmalloc,
copy from user and kfree, in the function body. If we remove these 3 function invocations
together in one Testing Cycle, it is safe and will not cause problem. But other kernel API
invocations located between these 3 invocations may be marked as CRITICAL.
In this example, o unlink cannot be removed because it is the function pointer to the
original sys unlink. Removing it can make deletion of files ineffective. This critical func-
tion invocation splits the current Context Group and forces removal of these 3 function
invocations to occur in different Testing Cycles. If we do not use reverse chronological
order, we will try to remove kmalloc first and assign kbuf with a fake address. The subse-
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quent function copy from user will write to an unsafe address and kfree will free a memory
block that has never been allocated. This will probably crash the system. Then we will
mistakenly mark kmalloc as CRITICAL, but in fact it is not. If we remove backwards in
the following order: kfree→ copy from user→ kmalloc, all 3 invocations will be safe to
remove. This greatly reduces the risk of mutual influences of function invocations.
In order to accelerate the handling of failing cases, we add two optimization techniques
to handle different failing scenarios:
(i) Test suite halts in the middle: Removal of some function invocations will cause the
test case to freeze without progress. We handle this by setting a timer and the time
interval is estimated by profiling the execution time of previous successful cases. If
the timer expires, we consider this Testing Cycle a failure and proceed to execute the
next one.
(ii) Test suite causes OS crash and rebooting: Removal of a critical function invocation
may cause OS crash and rebooting. In this case we do not have to wait for the timer
to expire. Instead, we add rebooting detection logic by checking whether the paging
bit is set in the control register. We can determine that it is a failing case if the system
is rebooting after we remove certain invocations.
To eliminate kernel API invocations in the driver, we patch them in the driver’s memory.
The method of patching varies according to platforms and file formats. For ELF under
Linux, the destination address of call instructions is unknown before loading. The module
loader resolves symbols of the kernel API in the entries of the relocation section and fixes
up the destination in the code section with the absolute address when loading the kernel
module. For Portable Executable (PE) under Windows, it utilizes the import address table
(IAT) to store the absolute virtual addresses of kernel APIs. The contents are populated
when that driver is loaded into the system. The kernel API invocations in PE drivers use two
calling styles. The first one uses the indirect call generated by the compiler and retrieves its
destination address from IAT. The second one makes a direct call to an indirect jump and
the jump destination is stored in the IAT. If the return value is not used by the subsequent
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instructions or it is a void function, we can simply replace the call or jmp instruction with a
series of nops in memory. If the return value is used later (e.g., as a predicate condition) and
can determine the control flow, replacing the instruction with nops will lead to an undefined
situation.
As we have already recorded the return value of every kernel API invocation in the
profiling phase, we can replace the calling instruction with a mov instruction that fills the
return value in the EAX register. This kind of replacement can be applied to the ELF
driver and the first calling style of PE drivers. For the second calling style of PE drivers,
we replace the indirect jump with ret to return to the original direct call to eliminate this
invocation.
The other issue we need to consider during memory patching is the calling convention
of the kernel API. If the caller is responsible for cleaning up the stack, no additional effort
is needed because push and pop operations are performed in the same function. If the callee
is responsible for cleaning up the stack, the situation becomes more complicated. In this
scenario, arguments are pushed into stack by the caller and the callee unwinds the stack
before returning. We choose to remove the push operations before the function invocation
in the caller to solve this problem. We can record the number of stack bytes that need to
be unwound. This is determined by the 16-bit parameter of the last ret instruction in the
kernel function. We then trace back from the kernel API invocation instruction to search
for push instructions and replace these instructions with nops.
If the patching operation is successful for the current Testing Cycle, which means the
function invocation is tested to be UNNEC, we record all the modified content and the
address of this function invocation for the rewriting phase. After writing new content into
the memory address of a kernel API invocation, we mark this specific basic block as a
candidate for memory invalidation. When the snapshot is reloaded in the next Testing Cycle
and the emulator tries to execute this basic block, we invalidate the cache of this basic block
and force the emulator to perform binary translation on it because the instructions inside it
have been modified and it should execute the newly translated code.
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3.3.4 Rewriting Phase
The last phase of DRIP’s driver purification procedure is to remove kernel API invoca-
tions marked as UNNEC in the binary file. We have already tested and retrieved the list of
unnecessary API invocations and their addresses in the memory from previous phases. The
procedure of patching the binary is similar to patching memory in the testing phase. We
need to map the loading addresses of API invocations to their relative addresses inside the
binary and apply the changes recorded in the testing phase to code sections.
Finishing these steps is not enough for the purified driver to work correctly. Every
relocatable driver has its own relocation table consisting of a list of pointers. These pointers
point to addresses in the binary that need to be fixed up after the driver is loaded into
the system. If we remove the function invocations whose addresses are included in the
relocation table, we also need to remove these relocation entries in the relocation table.
Otherwise the loader of the OS will still fix up the function address and cause memory
corruption. Because holes are not permitted in the relocation table for both ELF and PE,
we swap the value of each removed entry with the value of last entry in the relocation table
to fill the hole and adjust the table size in the header accordingly. For PE files, we also need
to calculate the new checksum value and write it into its PE header, otherwise Windows
will refuse to load the driver with the wrong checksum.
After finishing all these steps, we generate a new relocatable binary as a purified driver
and it can be loaded into the system for execution.
3.3.5 DRIP Prototype
We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype of DRIP. The prototype is built as a
component of QEMU. As a full system emulator, QEMU dynamically translates the guest
VM’s code at the granularity of basic blocks and executes them on the emulated CPU. Such
a platform enables us to perform binary analysis on the code region of drivers, intercept
dynamic control flow, and patch the memory at runtime to test effects of our kernel API
invocation removal operations. In addition to processor emulation, QEMU also provides a
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set of emulated devices, which provides an alternative to verify the correctness of test cases
through mapping the high-level program to low-level hardware events. For example, we
can simulate keystrokes in emulated hardware and capture the keys in the test suite to test
the keyboard driver.
To prove the generality of DRIP, We have tested the prototype on two guest operating
systems, Ubuntu 10.04 and Windows XP SP21. We believe that it is easy to extend our
current system to support more operating systems of different versions because DRIP does
not rely on the semantics of a guest VM. We support relocatable file formats for both PE
and ELF, which are standard formats for Windows and Linux drivers.
3.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation results for the DRIP prototype in two aspects,
effectiveness and performance. The hardware configuration of our testing platform is a Dell
OptiPlex 780 with Intel R© CoreTM 2 Duo CPU E8400 3.00GHz CPU and 4GB memory.
We develop and run the DRIP component on Ubuntu 11.10 (Linux kernel version 3.0.0)
to generate the purified driver. To prove that changes in the underlying infrastructure do
not affect the functionality of purified drivers, we use VMware Workstation 8.0 as the
hypervisor and Windows 7 as the host operating system to perform evaluation on purified
drivers. We allocate 1GB memory for each guest VM. The guest OSes are Ubuntu 10.04
(Linux kernel version 2.6.32) and Windows XP SP2.
3.4.1 Evaluation of Effectiveness
In the effectiveness evaluation, we use trojaned drivers infected by binary driver rewrit-
ing tools as input to DRIP and generate the corresponding purified drivers. Then we scru-
tinize the behavior of the generated driver manually to validate that the malicious behavior
has been eliminated and the functionality of the benign parts of the driver and the kernel are
1We use Ubuntu 10.04 and Windows XP SP2 because the trojaned driver samples we perform evaluation on
do not support newer versions yet.
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not impaired. We present five representative case studies on drivers in different categories
in detail and present other results briefly in Table 3.1.
Case Study I: E1000 NIC Driver with DR Rootkit Implanted under Linux
In phrack issue 61 [20], truff described a driver infection technique to hide the rootkit
and ensure that it will be reloaded after rebooting. The basic idea is to rename the malicious
function evil with init in the section .strtab to trick the system to load it. It only applies
to Linux kernel 2.4.x, so it is no longer valid for the latest Linux kernel because the mod-
ule loading procedure has been changed in new kernel version. From Linux Forum [22],
coolq extended this approach to Linux Kernel 2.6.x by modifying the module init function
entry in the relocation section .rel.gnu.linkonce.this module to guide the system to load
the initialization function in the malicious module. In the latest issue 68 of phrack [21],
styxˆ proposes a similar approach to infecting modules in kernel versions 2.6.x and 3.0.x.
It redirects init module to load function evil instead of original init function. In order to
enable malicious modules to invoke the original init function, it also updates the symbol
binding of init from local to global. The effects of these two approaches are equivalent and
we choose to use the former method to inject DR rootkit into an E1000 NIC driver as our
target.
The DR rootkit leverages a debug register-based hooking engine, which does not require
modification to the system call table, to perform traditional rootkit behavior, like hiding
processes, sockets, and files. To be more specific, it determines the name (in the version
we obtain the name is AAA) of a file it wants to hide. Then it hides the presence of this file
in the file system by modifying the file listing result in the directory. When executing this
file, the rootkit escalates AAA’s privilege to root, hides all the sockets created, hides all the
child processes forked, and prevents other processes from opening files owned by AAA.
The trojaned driver contains both the functionality of a benign E1000 NIC driver and a
malicious kernel rootkit. We pass it to DRIP to deactivate its malicious behavior and retain
the benign NIC driver behavior. We select and synthesize test cases from LTP (Linux Test
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Table 3.1.: Results of effectiveness evaluation against a spectrum of trojaned drivers
Name Infection Type Platform Purified Note
E1000+KBeast Module injection Linux X E1000 driver infected with KBeast as payload
E1000+DR Module injection Linux X Case Study I
E1000+Adore-ng Module injection Linux X E1000 driver infected with Adore-ng 0.56 as payload
E1000+Sebek Module injection Linux X E1000 driver infected with Sebek-3.2.0b as payload
E1000+Redir ERESI Linux X Cast Study II
Kbdevents Embedded Linux X Case Study III
Null+SSDT DaMouse Windows X Null.sys infected by DaMouse
Kbdclass+SSDT DaMouse Windows X Case Study IV
E1000325+SSDT DaMouse Windows X E1000325.sys infected by DaMouse
Beep+Klog Binary Transformaion Windows X Case Study V
E1000325+Klog Binary Transformation Windows X E1000325.sys infected with Klog as payload
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Project) [32], Linux utility programs, and Iperf to cover the benign functionalities of E1000
NIC driver and the reliability of the overall system. We have validated that the purified
driver behaves the same as a benign E1000 NIC driver with the malicious operations from
the DR rootkit eliminated.
Case Study II: E1000 NIC Driver with Kernel Function Redirection under Linux
From case study I, we learn that we can implant malicious code inside the initialization
function to install system call hooks. In fact, when the driver code invokes the kernel
function, we can intercept and redirect any function invocation to a malicious function
first. The malicious function can act as a proxy to invoke the original function and return
the result to the original invocation. This kernel function redirection technique is proposed
in the libkernsh of ERESI [25].
We prepare an interposition kernel module, which contains malicious functions from
the KBeast rootkit and link it with the E1000 NIC driver to generate a trojaned driver. The
relocation table of this new driver contains all the addresses of code/data that need to be
fixed up during loading. We scan this table to find the function invocation we want to
hijack and modify it to detour to the malicious function in the interposition module. The
payload, KBeast, is a new kernel rootkit based on other well-known rootkits and supports
the latest Linux kernel versions. It contains traditional rootkit functionalities, e.g., process
hiding, files hiding, keystroke logging, and local root escalation. Its basic idea is to patch
the system call table of Linux and detour system calls to its fake functions that are crafted
by the attacker. Because system calls are hijacked, KBeast can easily manipulate the inter-
mediate results and return fake results to the user. We select similar test cases as in Case
Study I to build our test suite to ensure the reliability of the system and core benign func-
tionalities of the E1000 NIC driver. After purification, we validate that KBeast’s cloaking
effects on the system have been eliminated and we still preserve the E1000 driver’s original
functionalities.
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Case Study III: Kbdevents under Linux
Kprobes [39] is a lightweight debugging mechanism in the Linux Kernel that allows
developers to intercept kernel routines at runtime to collect debugging information. Kb-
devents [40] is a Linux Kernel module based on Kprobes to intercept keyboard events. It
can be used as a debugging tool to verify the correctness of the keyboard driver. On ev-
ery key pressed, Kbdevents has additional functionality to launch user scripts from kernel
space, e.g., keylogger to dump keystrokes into a file, printscr to take screenshots and type-
writer to imitate typewriter sounds. These supplementary capabilities are not necessary for
debugging purposes. So we can perform purification on Kbdevents to minimize it to con-
tain only the debugging functionality. We build a special test suite to simulate keystrokes
out of VM, i.e., generate keyboard interrupt from QEMU, and capture them in the guest
VM to verify the correctness of Kbdevents’ debugging functionality. After purification,
we find all kernel API invocations related to launching user scripts from the kernel (e.g.,
call usermodehelper {setup,exec}) have been removed from the driver. The purified driver
can still intercept keystrokes to debug the Linux keyboard driver.
Case Study IV: Infected Kbdclass Driver by DaMouse under Windows
DaMouse [23] is a PE driver infection technique under Windows. It implants exist-
ing malicious code into a windows device driver in the system. It utilizes a virus coding
technique called Entry-Point Obscuring (EPO) to patch API invocation inside the device
driver. When this patched API is invoked, it installs a permanent System Service Dispatch
Table (SSDT) hook to redirect the system call to the hook function inside the driver. The
hook function contains malicious code to filter the results and can eventually complete the
procedure by invoking the original system call.
In this case study, we use DaMouse to infect kbdclass.sys, the keyboard class driver in
Windows. DaMouse patches the Kbdclass driver and install the SSDT hook at NtOpen-
Process. Then system calls to NtOpenProcess are redirected to the hook function called
NewNtOpenProcess. The filter code in the hook function determines whether the target
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process is iexplorer.exe, which belongs to the Internet Explorer. If so, the NtOpenProcess
request will be denied. The symptom noticeable to the user is that he/she cannot open a
new web page in the Internet Explorer. For other processes, the malicious code extracts
the NtOpenProcess’ arguments, e.g., pid and name, of calling process and dumps the result
through DbgPrint. We build the test suite for Kbdclass through sending keystrokes from
QEMU into VM, which is similar to Case Study III, and verify them in the test program
within the VM. After purification, we can keep the keyboard driver’s functionality, Internet
Explorer can open new tabs successfully and there is no process information leakage any
more.
Case Study V: Beep Driver Infected with Klog as Payload under Windows
In previous case studies, we have applied DRIP to purify drivers infected by existing bi-
nary infection tools. In this case study, we try to prove the generality of DRIP by purifying
trojaned drivers generated by a binary transformation tool called BISTRO [41]. BISTRO
enables transplanting binary functional module extracted from one binary into another bi-
nary. We extract the malicious functions, i.e., keyboard attaching and keystrokes dumping,
from klog, which is a well-known Windows keyboard sniffer. Then we utilize BISTRO
to implant the extracted functions into the beep driver of Windows. In order to check if
the beep driver works properly, we add some functionality-checking logic in the emulated
pc speaker in QEMU to verify the beep events. After purification, we load the purified
beep driver into the production environment and it works as expected and keyboard can no
longer dump sniffed keystrokes to a file any more.
3.4.2 Performance Evaluation
The time it takes for DRIP to purify a specific driver is highly dependent on the driver’s
code complexity, coverage of test suite, and hardware configuration. We present the com-
plete performance statistics of purification process for each trojaned driver in Table 3.2. It
shows the ratio of “Removed Function Invocations” to “Recorded Function Invocations”,
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Table 3.2.: Performance evaluation results with a spectrum of trojaned drivers
Name Ratio1 Time NTC2
E1000+KBeast 57/69 42min 13s 37
E1000+DR 13/25 21min 23s 40
E1000+Adore-ng 7/23 20min 46s 39
E1000+Sebek 13/34 19min 19s 35
E1000+Redir 37/53 35min 38s 34
Kbdevents 8/12 8min 25s 13
Null+SSDT 5/7 4min 4s 12
Kbdclass+SSDT 13/21 15min 31s 32
E1000325+SSDT 20/24 22min 15s 19
E1000325+Klog 22/28 24min 35s 19
Beep+Klog 24/35 31min 1s 44
1 Ratio here represents the ratio of “Removed Function
Invocations” to “Recorded Function Invocations”.
2 NTC stands for “Number of Testing Cycles”
the purification time, and the number of testing cycles. Our results indicate that DRIP is
suitable for offline driver purification.
We next measure the system performance overhead with the purified driver and com-
pare it with system performance with the trojaned driver. We use SPECINT 2000 under
Windows and UnixBench under Linux to measure the CPU performance. We normalize
the performance results and present them in Figure 3.5. The left bars indicate the normal-
ized performance scores (the higher the better) after loading the original trojaned driver.
The right bars are normalized performance scores after loading the purified driver. In the
experiments with trojaned E1000+KBeast/E1000+Redir, the system crashed when execut-

































































































































































Figure 3.5.: Comparison of CPU performance
the workload of test case file copy in the UnixBench and both trojaned drivers contain the
KBeast’s code. After purification, both drivers support the benchmark successfully be-
cause the KBeast functionality has been eliminated. For the other experiments, the purified
drivers improve benchmark performance by 1% to 45% compared with that under trojaned
drivers. This is intuitive to understand because the purified drivers are without unnecessary
kernel API invocations and thus execute less code than the trojaned drivers.
Besides testing CPU performance, we also utilize Iperf to measure the network through-
put for all cases involving the NIC driver. We compare the TCP throughput of the trojaned
driver with the purified driver and present the result in Figure 3.6. The left bars are band-
widths for trojaned drivers and the right bars are for purified drivers. From the results,




























































































































Figure 3.6.: Comparison of network throughput
compared with the trojaned drivers. The worst-case overhead observed is only 4% for the
purified E1000+Sebek driver.
Our performance evaluation results demonstrate that purified drivers generated by DRIP
can maintain (almost) the same network performance as under their trojaned versions.
Moreover, the purified drivers lead to better CPU performance with the removal of em-
bedded malicious operations.
3.5 Summary
We develop and evaluate DRIP to eliminate malicious/unnecessary behaviors of a tro-
janed kernel driver and preserve its benign functionalities for a target application. Through
our evaluation, we demonstrate the effectiveness of DRIP to achieve this goal. After load-
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ing a purified driver, we can maintain or even improve the system’s performance compared
with running the same workload under the trojaned driver.
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4 FACE-CHANGE: KERNEL MINIMIZATION COMPONENT
4.1 Problem Statement
Modern operating systems strive to shrink the size of the trusted computing base (TCB)
to ease code verification and minimize trust assumptions. For a general-purpose operating
system like Linux, kernel minimization has already been established as a practical approach
to reducing attack surface. But existing approaches [42–45] have a number of problems:
Coarse-Grained Profiling
In order to eliminate unnecessary code from the kernel, one must identify the kernel
code that is required to support the multiple applications within a system. The conventional
approach is to generate typical workloads and measure all active kernel code in a training
session. Profiling is performed on the whole system and does not distinguish among the
requirements of different applications [42]. This approach is well suited for generating
a customized kernel for a static, special-purpose system (e.g., an appliance or embedded
system). But for a general-purpose operating system supporting a variety of applications,
whole-system profiling unnecessarily enlarges the kernel attack surface of the system.
In practice, we observe that kernel code executed under different application contexts
varies drastically. Our experiments show that two distinct applications may share as little as
33.6% of their executed kernel code — thus system-wide kernel minimization would over-
approximate both applications’ kernel requirements. For example, the kernel functionality
needed by task manager top is to read statistics data from the memory-based proc file sys-
tem and write to the tty device. In sharp contrast, the Apache web server primarily requires
network I/O services from the kernel. If we profile a system running top and Apache si-
multaneously, we will expose the kernel’s networking code to top simply because Apache
is in the same environment. Further, assume top is the target of a malicious attack, the
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compromised top may be implanted with a parasite network server as a backdoor without
violating the minimized kernel’s constraint.
Flexibility to Adapt to Runtime Changes
The output of traditional kernel minimization approaches is a static kernel image cus-
tomized for a specific workload. However, it is nearly impossible to cover all execution
paths within an application’s code to trigger every possible kernel request. Even when
leveraging automatic test case generation techniques [35, 38, 46], profiling may still suf-
fer from the path coverage problem for large programs. Insufficient profiling may lead to
an underestimation of the kernel code required to support some application(s) at runtime.
Further, the required kernel code may change when running a new application that was not
profiled before or when the workload of an existing application suddenly changes. If this
newly requested kernel code is not included in the customized image, the violation may
crash the application or even panic the kernel.
To address these problems of whole-system-based kernel minimization, we have devel-
oped FACE-CHANGE, a component in our hypervisor-based active protection framework
to support dynamic switching among multiple minimized kernels, each for an individual
application. Throughout this chapter, we use the term kernel view to refer to the in-memory
kernel code presented to an individual application. In conventional kernels, all concurrently
running user-level processes share the same kernel view containing the entire kernel code
section, which we refer to as a full kernel view. FACE-CHANGE aims to present each pro-
cess with a different, customized kernel view, which is prepared individually in advance
by profiling the application’s needs. Any unnecessary kernel code is eliminated to mini-
mize the attack surface accessible to this specific application. At runtime, FACE-CHANGE
identifies the current process context and dynamically switches to its customized kernel
view.
To support applications that were not previously profiled, we are able to profile them
in independent (offline) sessions to generate their kernel views. We then load the kernel
view for a new application dynamically without interrupting the system’s execution. This
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removes the burden of re-compiling and/or installing a new customized kernel upon the
addition of a new application.
Furthermore, we include a kernel code recovery mechanism for the event that an ap-
plication tries to reach code outside of the boundary of its kernel view. This may be due
to incomplete profiling (e.g., interrupt handler’s code with no attachment to any process
or some workload not completely exercised) or malicious tampering (e.g., some injected
logic requests new/different kernel features). We are able to recover the missing code and
backtrack its provenance to identify the anomalous execution paths. Such capability can
be leveraged by administrators to analyze the attack patterns of both user-level and kernel-
level malware.
FACE-CHANGE makes the following contributions:
• A quantitative study of per-application kernel requirements in a multi-programming
system.
• A hypervisor-based dynamic kernel view switching technique. FACE-CHANGE is
transparent to the guest VM and requires no patching or recompilation of the guest
OS kernel.
• A kernel code recovery mechanism to recover requested but missing code and back-
track the provenance of such an anomaly/exception.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the motivation,
goals and assumptions of FACE-CHANGE. Section 4.3 provides the detailed design of
FACE-CHANGE. Section 4.4 gives case studies on the effectiveness of FACE-CHANGE on
user/kernel malware attacks and evaluates its performance. We summarize FACE-CHANGE
in Section 4.5.
4.2 System Overview
In this section, we introduce a quantitative method to measure the kernel code require-
ments of a specific application. We then use these measurements to evaluate the similarity
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of kernel code requirements between applications. The result of this quantitative study mo-
tivates the development of FACE-CHANGE. Finally, we present the goals and assumptions
of our design.
4.2.1 Motivation
Each application, including both the base program and any libraries loaded into the user
address space, interacts with the OS through system calls to request services (e.g., manipu-
lating files, spawning threads, IPC, etc.). The set of system calls utilized by an application
varies substantially across different application types and workloads, and intuitively, dif-
ferent system calls will reach different parts of the kernel’s code. Further, different values
passed as parameters to the same system calls may lead to totally different execution paths
within the kernel. For example, because of Linux’s virtual file system (VFS) interface, a
read system call for disk-based files in ext4-fs and memory-based files in procfs will be
dispatched to entirely different portions of the kernel’s code.
To accurately measure a target application’s kernel code requirements, we monitor the
system execution at the basic block level. We briefly describe the profiling tool here and
will present the detailed design in Section 4.3.1. We record any executed basic blocks
which satisfy the following two criteria:
(i) The basic block belongs to the kernel, i.e., its memory address is in kernel space.
(ii) The basic block is executed in the target application’s context.
After merging any adjacent blocks, we get a range list K[app] for a target application (de-
noted by subscript [app]) in the form:
K[app] = {([B1,E1],T1), · · · , ([Bi,Ei],Ti)}
Bi and Ei denote the beginning and end addresses for the i-th in-memory code segment.
Ti indicates the type for this memory segment, where Ti can be either “base kernel” or the
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name of a kernel module. For kernel modules, we record addresses relative to the module’s
base address because a module’s loading addresses may change at runtime.
We introduce three definitions for comparing two distinct application’s kernel code
requirements:
1. K[app1] ∩K[app2]
The intersection of two range lists outputs the overlapping address ranges between
them. The result is still a range list.
2. LEN(K[app])





The SIZE of a range list outputs the size of kernel code in this range list.






A similarity index S indicates the proportion of the overlapping of kernel code required
between two applications. Besides common system call execution paths, the overlapping
kernel code also consists of functionality needed by every application, e.g., process sched-
uler and interrupt handling code. Through the profiling of well-known Linux applications,
we find that similarity indices range from 33.6% for applications that are orthogonal in
type (such as top vs. Firefox) to 86.5% for similar applications (such as Apache vs. vs-
ftpd). Table 4.1 (Section 4.4) shows the similarity indices for all profiled applications.
These measurements support our earlier hypothesis that kernel code execution paths vary
substantially across different application types. This also indicates that application-specific
kernel views can minimize the kernel attack surface far beyond that of system-wide kernel
minimization.
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4.2.2 Goals and Assumptions
We state the goals for our system in four aspects: strictness, robustness, transparency
and flexibility.
Strictness: The kernel view generated for a specific application should only contain the
kernel code that is necessary for the correct execution of this application under a normal
usage scenario. We should eliminate all other excessive code from the kernel view to avoid
enlarging the kernel’s attack surface. If an application reaches kernel code that does not
belong to its kernel view, we should record the access in detail for later analysis.
Robustness: If an application is running under the same workload and same usage
scenario as during profiling, the behavior of this application running with a customized
kernel view should be no different than with a full kernel view. If the application accesses
any kernel code that is not included in the customized kernel view, we should recover the
missing code and record this violation silently without being detected by the application.
Transparency: There is no need to change any code in the applications or operating
system. The hypervisor controls all FACE-CHANGE operations, which remain transparent
to the guest VM.
Flexibility: Administrators can dynamically load, unload, and switch the kernel view
for a specific application at any time. This should neither jeopardize the functionality of
the currently running application nor the system as a whole.
We assume that, when we generate customized kernel views in the profiling phase, the
environment, including both the applications and the kernel, should not be tampered with
by malware.
4.3 Design and Implementation
In this section, we give a detailed description of the overall design of FACE-CHANGE,
highlight the challenges we face and the solutions we propose. Then we discuss the detailed
implementation of our prototype system.
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We divide the whole system into two phases in chronological order: the profiling phase
and the runtime phase. The profiling phase monitors a target program’s execution and,
based on the active kernel code in this process’ context, generates a configuration file de-
scribing the application’s customized kernel view. In the runtime phase, FACE-CHANGE
builds a new customized kernel view based on each application’s configuration file and
forces the process to use this customized kernel view whenever the guest OS schedules it.
Process 1
Kernel
Process 2 Process 3 Process 1 Process 2 Process 3
Profiling Phase Runtime Phase
{user space} {user space}













Figure 4.1.: Overview of FACE-CHANGE
Figure 4.1 shows a high-level example of these two phases. Assume we want to profile
Process 1 in the profiling phase. When the kernel schedules Process 1 to run, we start
to record all the kernel code executed in its context. When Process 1 is scheduled out,
we pause the recording until the process is re-scheduled. This procedure also applies to
Processes 2 and 3. At last we generate three configuration files for the kernel views of
these three processes respectively. In the runtime phase, we load each customized kernel
view for the corresponding process. For example, Process 1 can only access [Process 1]
kernel view when it is running.
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4.3.1 Profiling Phase
Design of the Profiler
We implemented our profiler as a component of the QEMU [16] 1.6.0 full system em-
ulator. This enables the profiler to track an application’s execution at the granularity of a
basic block. We use VMI techniques to track context switches within the guest OS. When
the guest OS schedules the target application, the profiler records any address ranges of
kernel code executed in this process’ context. For code within a kernel module, we record
addresses relative to the module’s base address. Once the application has been sufficiently
profiled, the profiler exports all recorded kernel code segments to a kernel view configura-
tion file.
Test Suite Selection
For each application to be profiled, the user should choose a test suite to simulate the
expected real-world workload for this application. For instance, when profiling a server
application, the user may deploy it in the real environment to handle requests, or for an
interactive application, one may simulate the I/O operations of a typical user. To give a
specific example, when profiling a mysql server, we set up a RUBiS1 [47] server and used
its own simulated client to generate workloads for the mysql database.
It is difficult to ensure that all code paths through an application are executed during
profiling, thus it is possible that at runtime the application may access some kernel code
missed by the profiling phase. One alternative to a test suite driven profiler is to use sym-
bolic execution to generate high-coverage test cases, but this approach may not scale to
large applications. To address this problem, we employ a kernel code recovery mechanism
in the runtime phase to recover any missing kernel code. We explain this mechanism in
detail in Section 4.3.2.
1RUBiS is an ebay-like auction service that heavily uses mysql.
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Interrupt Context
In modern OS kernels, hardware triggered asynchronous interrupts can happen at any
time, and thus interrupt handler code is not attached to any single process’ context. We
choose to include the interrupt handler’s code in every application’s kernel view to avoid
having to repeatedly recover this code at runtime. Our profiler leverages QEMU to identify
the occurrence of an interrupt. If this interrupt is not a software interrupt (such as a system
call), we can infer that the system has entered interrupt context. At this point, we record
all kernel code addresses accessed in the interrupt’s context for use in all applications’
customized kernel view.
4.3.2 Runtime Phase
We describe the general design of the runtime phase in Algorithm 3 and discuss some
interesting features below in detail.
Kernel View Initialization
When loading a new kernel view configuration, FACE-CHANGE allocates memory
pages for both the base kernel code and any kernel modules’ code and fills them with
undefined instruction (UD2) “0xf 0xb” (UD2 will raise an invalid opcode exception when
executed). FACE-CHANGE then loads the kernel code specified in the kernel view configu-
ration into it’s appropriate locations in the new pages. Recall that during profiling, we track
the kernel control flow at the basic block level. However, rather than loading individual ba-
sic blocks, we slightly relax the condition to load the entire kernel function which contains
the valid basic blocks. The rationales for this relaxation are: (1) The adjacent code within
the same kernel function is more likely to be accessed at runtime. Thus, we can reduce
the frequency of kernel code recovery by loading the whole kernel function. (2) UD2 is
a 2-byte instruction. If an address range in the kernel view configuration starts from an
odd-numbered address, only the first byte of UD2 will be in the kernel view; therefore, the
72
Algorithm 3 Kernel View Switching/Kernel Code Recovery
Input: modulelist← kernel module list
context switch addr← Address of context switch function
resume userspace addr← Address of resume userspace function
full kernel view index← Index of full kernel view
1: - - - - - - - - Kernel View Switching - - - - - - - - - -
2: procedure SWITCH BASE KERNEL(index)
3: kernel range← GET KERNEL RANGE()
4: LOAD KERNEL VIEW EPT(kernel range, index)
5: procedure SWITCH KERNEL MODULES(index)
6: for all mod in modulelist do
7: module range← GET MODULE RANGE(mod)
8: LOAD MODULE VIEW EPT(module range, index)
9: procedure SWITCH KERNEL VIEW(index)
10: SWITCH BASE KERNEL(index)
11: SWITCH KERNEL MODULES(index)
12: procedure HANDLE KERNEL VIEW TRAP(vcpu)
13: if vcpu.rip = context switch addr then
14: procinfo← READ PROC INFO(vcpu)
15: index← KERNEL VIEW SELECTOR(procinfo)
16: if index = full kernel view index then
17: CLEAR RESUME USERSPACE TRAP()
18: SWITCH KERNEL VIEW(index)
19: else
20: ENABLE RESUME SPACE TRAP()
21: lastindex← index
22: else if vcpu.rip = resume userspace addr then
23: CLEAR RESUME USERSPACE TRAP()
24: SWITCH KERNEL VIEW(lastindex)
25: - - - - - - - - Kernel Code Recovery - - - - - - - - - -
26: procedure BACK TRACE(rip, rbp)
27: iter rbp← rbp
28: prev rip← rip
29: while IS VALID(prev rip) do
30: DUMP BACKTRACE(prev rip)
31: prev rip← READ PREV RIP(iter rbp)
32: prev rbp← READ PREV RBP(iter rbp)
33: if PREV RIP = “0B 0F” then
34: RECOVER BACKTRACE(prev rip)
35: iter rbp← prev rbp
36: procedure HANDLE INVALID OPCODE(vcpu)
37: BACK TRACE(vcpu.rip, vcpu.rbp)
38: mem page← GET MEMORY PAGE(vcpu.rip)
39: start addr← SEARCH BACKWARDS(vcpu.rip)
40: end addr← SEARCH FORWARDS(vcpu.rip)
41: FETCH FILL CODE(page, start addr, end addr)
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processor may misinterpret the fragmented UD2 as a different instruction. Loading entire
kernel functions avoids this problem because the boundaries of kernel functions are aligned
on powers-of-two2.
To identify function boundaries, we search for a function header signature backwards
and forwards from the basic blocks marked in the kernel view configuration. For exam-
ple, a common function header signature in the x86 Linux kernel is “push ebp; mov ebp,
esp”(binary opcodes “0x55 0x89 0xe5”). There is a possibility that one kernel function may
cross two memory pages and further, one single instruction may split across pages. In this
case, we continue searching from the head of the next page or the tail of the previous page
to locate the complete kernel function.
After all of the kernel view’s code is identified and loaded into the new pages, FACE-
CHANGE redirects any kernel code access made by this application to the customized kernel
view. We implement our FACE-CHANGE runtime component within a KVM hypervisor
(i.e., kvm-kmod-3.6 and qemu-kvm-1.2.0) and leverage Extended Page Tables (EPT) to
manipulate kernel code mappings. When using EPT, the guest VM maintains its own page
table to translate guest virtual addresses to guest physical addresses. The hypervisor then
uses EPT to transparently map the guest physical addresses to host physical addresses.
During guest OS context switches, FACE-CHANGE changes the page table entries in the
EPT to direct any kernel code accesses to the customized kernel view for the application
(instead of the original kernel’s code). This procedure is explained in the Section 4.3.2.
Again, FACE-CHANGE must take care when handling kernel modules’ code in a cus-
tomized kernel view. Recall that kernel modules are dynamically loaded at runtime in the
kernel’s heap, and thus, during the profiling phase, we record these addresses relative to the
module’s base address. Before we load modules’ code into a kernel view, we traverse the
kernel’s module list to identify the loading addresses for any modules marked in the kernel
view configuration. Then we load the valid kernel code in the code pages for the kernel
modules.



























Figure 4.2.: The procedure of dynamic kernel view switching and kernel code recovery
Kernel View Switching
Figure 4.2 illustrates each step of the kernel view switching procedure. In step 1, the
guest OS chooses a process to run and prepares to context switch to the new process. In
step 2, using VMI, we intercept this context switch and determine which customized kernel
view is needed for the new application. In step 3A and 3B, we modify the pointers to the
page directory (level 2 in the EPT) corresponding to the base kernel code and all kernel
modules’ code respectively. Because kernel modules’ code pages are scattered in the kernel
heap, we reuse any entries in the page directory that point to kernel data and only modify
the entries pointing to the modules’ code.
We also develop a set of optimizations to improve performance. Through our experi-
mentation, we find that switching kernel views immediately at context switches may cause
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the application to miss interrupts, and thus jeopardize I/O performance. We choose in-
stead to switch kernel views when the code resumes user space execution after the context
switch. This will still satisfy the strictness goal (minimize the attack surface) and mitigate
the performance degradation caused by missed interrupts. We also check whether the pre-
vious process and the next process use the same kernel view, and if so, we can avoid one
additional kernel view switch.
Kernel Code Recovery
There are two situations where FACE-CHANGE may need to recover missing kernel
code:
(i) An incomplete kernel view generated during profiling: Testing in a controlled run-
time environment without introducing any attacks, we find that the majority of the
benign kernel recoveries are triggered due to missing code for handling interrupts.
For example, KVM provides a para-virtualized clock device to the guest VM. This
KVM specific code cannot be included in the kernel view during the profiling in
QEMU. Thus, at runtime, FACE-CHANGE needs to recover the missing kernel func-
tions shown below in chronological order:
kvm clock get cycles→ kvm clock read
→ pvclock clocksource read→ native read tsc
In addition, interrupt handling code is not bound to any process and can be triggered
by hardware interrupts at any time. In the profiling phase, we may not observe all
possible interrupts for this application. Before missing code recovery, we inspect the
current call stack to determine whether the current execution is in interrupt context
(through backtracking the current function traces). Thereafter we recover the missing
kernel code to correctly handle those interrupts.
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All other benign kernel code recoveries due to incomplete profiling of the applica-
tion’s execution paths are recorded as a reference for the administrator to ameliorate
the profiling test suite.
(ii) Anomalous execution caused by malicious attacks: User level malware may hijack
a normal process to execute shellcode which requests kernel services that are not in
the customized kernel view. Additionally, kernel level rootkits can detour the ker-
nel’s execution path to their payload’s malicious code, and obviously, this malicious
payload will not be in any application’s kernel view. FACE-CHANGE is designed to
report the suspicious execution traces, but still recover the kernel code in this case. In
order to track the provenance of the attack, we not only record any recovered func-
tions, but also backtrack the anomalous execution’s call stack to find the origin of the
invocation chain for later analysis.
As we mentioned in Section 4.3.2, we fill any kernel code space that is not in the kernel
view with UD2 “0xf 0xb”. When executed, UD2 raises an invalid opcode exception which
causes a trap to the hypervisor. We illustrate this as step 4 invalid opcode trap in Figure 4.2.
After intercepting the trap, we check the faulting address and try to fetch the missing kernel
function from the original kernel code pages (step 5 in Figure 4.2).
During our implementation of the kernel code recovery mechanism, we fixed an inter-
esting cross-view bug in FACE-CHANGE that is worth mentioning here. If no customized
kernel view is enabled for a specific process, it will have a full kernel view. When executing
this process, its kernel execution may be interrupted or the process may voluntarily give up
the CPU. If we enable a customized kernel view for that process at this time and the process
is re-scheduled by the kernel, some functions in the process’ execution stack may not be in
the new kernel view. We give an example of this situation in Figure 4.3. In this case, the
process is re-scheduled while executing pipe poll at address 0xc0211370. The invocation
chain in the stack is as follows:
syscall call → sys poll → do sys poll
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We find that because sys poll and do sys poll are not in the new customized kernel view,
their code regions are filled with UD2 (shown in red). If we recover pipe poll and return
to its caller (do sys poll), the process will execute undefined instructions. For do sys poll
this is not a problem because the return address (0xc021a526) is an even number. Exe-
cution will return to the “0xf 0xb” opcode (UD2), causing an invalid opcode trap, and we
can recover do sys poll as normal. We call this as a lazy recovery. But for sys poll, the
return address (0xc021a759) is an odd number; therefore, the opcode starting at address
0xc021a759 is “0xb 0xf.” This opcode will be misinterpreted by the processor and not
cause a trap. Our solution is, during code recovery, to backtrack the stack and recover any
caller whose return-target opcode starts with “0xb 0xf ” in the new kernel view. We call
this instant recovery. In this example, when we recover the code for pipe poll, we recover
sys poll instantly.
Disable Customized Kernel View
We can load/unload customized kernel views dynamically at runtime to satisfy our flex-
ibility goal. When we disable a kernel view, FACE-CHANGE de-allocates all memory pages
for that kernel view and switches the EPT back to a full kernel view without interrupting
the running application. This enables us to adapt to an altered environment smoothly by
“hot-plugging” kernel views.
|--Backtrace: 0xc021a526 <do_sys_poll+0x136>
   0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb
|--Backtrace: 0xc021a759 <sys_poll+0x59>
   0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf 0xb 0xf
|--Backtrace: 0xc01033ec <syscall_call+0x7>
   0x89 0x44 0x24 0x18 0xfa 0x8d 0xb6 0x0 0x0 0x0
Recover 0xc0211370 <pipe_poll+0x0> for kernel[top] do_sys_poll:
...
c021a521: e8 4a f4 ff ff       call   0xc0219970 <do_poll>
c021a526: 89 85 8c fc ff ff    mov    %eax,-0x374(%ebp)
sys_poll:
...
c021a754: e8 97 fc ff ff       call   0xc021a3f0 <do_sys_poll>
c021a759: 83 f8 fc             cmp    $0xfffffffc,%eax
syscall_call:
...
c01033e5: ff 14 85 50 81 59 c0     call   *-0x3fa67eb0(,%eax,4)
c01033ec: 89 44 24 18              mov    %eax,0x18(%esp)
'0xf 0xb' can trap => Lazy recovery
'0xb 0xf' cannot trap  => Instant recovery
1
2
Figure 4.3.: Cross-View kernel code recovery
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4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation of FACE-CHANGE in two aspects: security
and performance. For the security evaluation, we first use the similarity index to measure
the similarities of kernel views among applications. Then we demonstrate the effective-
ness of our system to track attack provenance of both user-level malware and kernel-level
rootkits. For the performance evaluation, we measure the overall system performance with
FACE-CHANGE enabled and the I/O performance for an Apache web server with a mini-
mized kernel view. The hardware configuration of our testing platform is a Lenovo Idea-
pad U410 with Intel R© CoreTM i7 3.10GHz and 8GB memory. We run FACE-CHANGE on
Linux Mint 13 x86 64 (Linux kernel version 3.5.0). We test our prototype with a guest VM
using Ubuntu 10.04 (Linux kernel version 2.6.32) i386 LTS release3, further since FACE-
CHANGE requires minimal domain knowledge, it will be convenient to extend our current
system to support more Linux kernel versions with only minor changes to the implementa-
tion. The guest VM’s memory is 2GB and it uses bridged networking.
4.4.1 Security Evaluation
Kernel View Variation among Applications
We use the similarity index defined in Section 4.2 to measure the difference of kernel
views among 12 well-known Linux applications from different categories. For example,
Apache and vsftpd are server applications that handle network requests. Firefox and gvim
are interactive applications that respond to user input. We present the profiling results as
a square matrix in Table 4.1. The main diagonal(ց) of the matrix is marked with gray
cells. Each cell on the main diagonal presents the size of the kernel view for this specific
application (e.g., Vsftpd executes 341KB kernel code in the profiling phase). We com-
pare the kernel code address ranges between every two applications to get the overlapping
size. All entries above the main diagonal represent the overlapping size between two ap-




Table 4.1.: Similarity matrix for applications’ kernel views
firefox totem gvim apache vsftpd top tcpdump mysqld bash sshd gzip eog
firefox 443KB 275KB 251KB 302KB 284KB 149KB 218KB 305KB 221KB 316KB 213KB 286KB
totem 62.1% 286KB 239KB 210KB 217KB 140KB 166KB 228KB 196KB 220KB 174KB 257KB
gvim 56.7% 83.6% 262KB 206KB 206KB 142KB 160KB 220KB 190KB 211KB 166KB 247KB
apache 68.2% 62.7% 61.5% 335KB 284KB 141KB 210KB 265KB 203KB 292KB 200KB 215KB
vsftpd 67.9% 63.6% 60.5% 83.5% 341KB 145KB 208KB 272KB 205KB 293KB 206KB 222KB
top 33.6% 49.2% 54.2% 42.2% 42.7% 167KB 135KB 138KB 147KB 153KB 121KB 143KB
tcpdump 49.2% 58.0% 61.1% 62.6% 61.0% 57.6% 234KB 203KB 165KB 216KB 169KB 168KB
mysqld 68.7% 68.1% 65.4% 78.9% 79.8% 41.1% 60.5% 336KB 186KB 260KB 212KB 230KB
bash 50.0% 68.7% 72.6% 60.6% 60.1% 60.8% 68.3% 55.5% 242KB 223KB 158KB 215KB
sshd 71.3% 58.4% 55.9% 77.5% 77.7% 40.5% 57.3% 68.9% 59.0% 378KB 216KB 233KB
gzip 48.1% 60.9% 63.4% 59.6% 60.4% 49.5% 69.0% 63.2% 64.6% 57.1% 245KB 177KB
eog 64.6% 86.5% 83.2% 64.2% 65.2% 48.1% 56.5% 68.7% 72.4% 61.7% 59.7% 297KB
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plications’ kernel views (e.g., tcpdump and Firefox have 218KB overlapping kernel code).
Entries below the main diagonal represent the similarity index calculated using Equation
(4.1) in Section 4.2. The similarity index demonstrates the similarity of kernel attack sur-
face between different applications. For applications of different types, lower percentages
are better as this ensures a distinct minimized kernel in both cases, and for similar applica-
tions high percentages are expected since both require similar kernel services. As Table 4.1
shows, the similarity indices range from 33.6% for dissimilar applications to 86.5% for
applications with common kernel requirements. This proves our intuition that if two appli-
cations are from different categories they have relatively low similarity index and leverage
different parts of the kernel.
Attack Detection and Provenance
Because the kernel attack surface for each individual application is reduced according
to the profiling results, we can reveal malicious attack patterns whenever a process goes
beyond the boundary of its kernel view. Further, we backtrack the requested kernel code to
identify the exact attack provenance.
This result is a step further than traditional system-wide kernel minimization tech-
niques [42–45] because FACE-CHANGE is able to detect anomalous execution based on an
individual application’s kernel view. To demonstrate that FACE-CHANGE can reveal attack
evidences that may go unnoticed under traditional system-wide minimization techniques,
we also create a “union” kernel view (the union of all kernel views from the applications
we have profiled) as the system-wide minimized kernel. System-wide minimization may
fail to detect an attack if the attack utilizes kernel code required by any application in the
system. FACE-CHANGE greatly reduces this “blind spot” because it is able to detect kernel
execution anomalies specific to a single application.
In this chapter, we evaluate the effectiveness of attack detection with 13 user-level mal-
ware (8 of them use online runtime infection and 5 use offline binary infection) and 3
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Table 4.2.: Results of security evaluation against a spectrum of user/kernel malware
Name Infection Method Payload Note
Injectso Online infection UDP server Case study I
Cymothoa v1 Online infection Bind /bin/sh to TCP port and fork shell Recover sys fork and TCP server
Cymothoa v2 Online infection Bind /bin/sh to TCP port and fork shell Recover sys clone and TCP server
Cymothoa v3 Online infection Remote file sniffer Recover sys settimer and signal handler
Cymothoa v4 Online infection Single process backdoor Case study II
Hotpatch Online infection File writing of injecting timestamp Recover injection and file writing procedure
Xlibtrace Online infection Tracking function invocation Recover tty procedures on terminal
Hijacker Online infection Redirection of library function Recover the procedure of hijacking
Infelf v1 Offline infection Remote shell server Recover remote shell socket operations
Infelf v2 Offline infection Register dumping Case study III
Arches Offline infection Register dumping Recover register dumping operations on terminal
Elf-infector Offline infection Register dumping Same as above
ERESI Offline infection UDP server Recover creation of udp server
KBeast Kernel rootkit File/Process hiding, keystroke sniffer Case study IV
Sebek Kernel rootkit Confidential data collection Recover kernel code in sebek module
Adore-ng Kernel rootkit File/Process hiding Recover kernel code in adore-ng module
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kernel-level rootkits. This data is presented in Table 4.2. We highlight four of these attack
case studies in detail.
Case Study I — Injectso
    // create socket
   sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
   ...
   // bind to the specified port
   server.sin_family = AF_INET;
   server.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
   server.sin_port = htons(port); 
   err = bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &server, sizeof(server));
   ...
   
   // receive data loop
   while (1) {   
       memset(buffer, 0, BUFF_LEN);
       // receive data
       err = recvfrom(sock, buffer, BUFF_LEN, 0, NULL, 0);
       ...     
   }























Figure 4.4.: The attack pattern of an injectso’s payload
Injectso [48] is a well-known hot-patching tool used to modify the behavior of a run-
ning process by injecting a dynamic shared object into its address space. It detours the cur-
rent instruction pointer to libc dlopen mode and builds a fake stack to invoke the shared
object’s code. The shellcode’s payload is a UDP server, and the target program is top.
Obviously, the kernel view for top does not contain any kernel code needed to run a UDP
server (even if the kernel views of other co-existing applications do), and thus Injectso’s
payload triggered the kernel code recovery mechanism.
From the kernel code recovery log, we can precisely identify the anomalous execution
caused by Injectso in the top process. In Figure 4.4, we present the UDP server payload’s
code and the corresponding kernel code recovery log. The UDP server will create a socket,
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bind to an address/port, and receive data using the C library calls socket, bind and recvfrom
respectively. It is straightforward to identify which library functions correspond to the
recovered kernel code sections (e.g., bind executes a kernel code path from sys bind to
release sock 4 in chronological order).
We test the system again and apply the “union” kernel view, which includes both top
and some network applications (such as Firefox and Apache) to represent a system-wide
minimization technique. These network applications require the same kernel networking
code as the UDP server payload, and thus this case results in no UDP related kernel func-
tions being recovered. Due to the enlarged attack surface of the system-wide minimized
kernel, this attack would achieve its goal with the available kernel code and thus go unde-
tected.
Case Study II — Cymothoa
Cymothoa [49] is a shellcode injection framework that uses different infection methods
and payload types. The parasite executable coexists with the host process stealthily while
the host process continues to work properly. We test all four working parasites introduced
in the article “Single Process Parasite” [50] in Phrack issue 68 and successfully reveal all
four attack behaviors. The parasite uses the sys fork and sys clone system calls to create
a child process/thread to execute its payload. Later variants are more stealthy, utilizing
settimer and signal to schedule the shellcode inside the host process. Here, we give a
detailed description of the most stealthy (variant 4) parasite’s control flow. This variant
creates a backdoor parasite living within another process (bash is the target program in
this case). First the shellcode registers a signal handler for the SIGALRM signal. Then it
opens a nonblocking I/O socket, binds it to a specific port, and sets the SIGALRM timer.
When the SIGALRM signal is handled, the parasite accepts any connection on the socket
and launches a remote shell. The parent then sets the timer again and resumes execution of
the host process.
4Symbols of kernel functions are not necessary for backtracking. We use them here for clear demonstration.
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Again, the kernel code executed by the shellcode’s actions, e.g., setting the signal han-
dler, creating the TCP server, and setting the alarm clock are recorded in the kernel recovery
log. This reveals both the infection method and payload behaviors of the stealthy parasite.
Also, like before, existing kernel minimization techniques may fail to detect this attack en-
tirely because other applications will likely add these kernel regions into the union-based
minimized kernel.
Case Study III — Infelf
In addition to runtime infection malware, we also apply our techniques to detect com-
promised applications. Infelf [51] is an offline binary infection tool that is able to implant
trojan code into an existing binary program. It splits trojan code into multiple instruction
blocks, inserts them into free alignment areas between functions, and concatenates their
execution path with jump instructions. We use this tool to implant a hardware register
printing function into the gvim binary and redirect gvim’s entry function to this shellcode.
During gvim’s startup, FACE-CHANGE recovers numerous TTY kernel functions which are
not included in gvim’s kernel view. Again, in this case, a whole-system kernel minimiza-
tion technique would be unable to detect this attack on a system containing both gvim and
terminal applications that require the kernel’s TTY functions (such as tcpdump or bash).
Case Study IV — KBeast Rootkit
In addition to user-level attacks, our system is also able to detect rootkit attacks at the
kernel level. Because rootkit attacks originate from shellcode in kernel space, the interpre-
tation of kernel recovery logs is different from user-level attacks. Kernel-level attacks aim
to hide their malicious behavior by detouring the kernel’s control flow during execution of
certain kernel routines (e.g., listing kernel modules, network connections, etc.). Again, we
assume that no rootkit is present during the initial profiling phase, and so no rootkit code
can be included in the kernel view configuration files. When FACE-CHANGE allocates a
new kernel view, if a rootkit has already been installed in the runtime system’s kernel, the
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Figure 4.5.: The attack pattern of a KBeast rootkit
rootkit’s code will not be loaded into the new view and will be filled with UD2 by default.
If the application later triggers FACE-CHANGE’S code recovery, the log will allow us to
clearly see where the hijack took place. A more complicated scenario that FACE-CHANGE
can detect is a rootkit which is installed while FACE-CHANGE is enforcing an application’s
kernel view. In this scenario, the rootkit will be detected in the same way as user-level mal-
ware: by the kernel functionality that it requests to perform its malicious functionalities.
Again, this code will be recovered and we can backtrace recovered kernel code to reveal
the anomalous execution.
We use the KBeast [52] rootkit as an example to show this process in detail. KBeast
is a new rootkit that inherits many features from traditional Linux kernel rootkits (e.g.,
file/process/socket/module hiding, keystroke sniffer) and it supports recent kernel versions.
We use the kernel view for the bash program to detect the existence of KBeast. All the
keystrokes typed in bash are processed by the keyboard event handler. KBeast is able to
intercept and read the keystrokes and store this data into a hidden file, and it will hide its
existence by removing itself from the kernel module list. In Figure 4.5, by backtracking the
recovered kernel functions, we find code addresses with an UNKNOWN tag. This indicates
that these memory addresses are not in any identified memory regions. We also find that
KBeast’s code hijacks the entries of some system calls and invokes strnlen to check the
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length of the keystroke buffer, filp open to open the hidden file, and do sync write to write
the keystroke data into this file.
4.4.2 Performance Evaluation
System Performance
Figure 4.6.: Normalized system performance results from UnixBench
We use the UnixBench benchmark suite to measure and evaluate system performance.
Specifically, we take three different measurements:
(i) We run UnixBench without enabling FACE-CHANGE to get a baseline result.
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(ii) We enable FACE-CHANGE, load one kernel view (Apache), and run the benchmark.
This tests whole-system performance overhead after enabling our system.
(iii) Next, we launch the applications5 from Table 4.1 and load their kernel views one at a
time. After each kernel view is loaded, we rerun the benchmark. This measures any
performance influence on the whole system after loading multiple kernel views.
In Figure 4.6, we normalize the performance scores of the UnixBench (higher performance
score indicates better performance) based on the baseline score from step 1. The x axis rep-
resents the number of kernel views we enabled simultaneously. We find that, compared to
the baseline result, enabling our system incurs 5%∼7% performance overhead on the whole
system. Adding multiple kernel views incurs trivial impact on the system performance. We
find that the only performance degradation occurs during the subtest Pipe-based Context
Switching of UnixBench. This is not surprising because FACE-CHANGE triggers additional
traps for each context switch. We could largely minimize the performance overhead with
optimization of the context switch handler’s code.
I/O Performance for Apache
We also evaluate FACE-CHANGE’s influence on application’s I/O performance. Specif-
ically, we use httperf to compare Apache’s performance before and after enabling FACE-
CHANGE. In this test, we increase the request rate from 5 to 60 requests per second (100
connections in total) to test the I/O performance. We present the ratio of the I/O throughput
after enabling FACE-CHANGE to before in Figure 4.7. From Figure 4.7, we find that I/O
throughput will not be affected below the threshold rate of 55 reqs/second but may begin to
degrade afterwards. This indicates that our system has no influence on the network through-
put before the CPU becomes a bottleneck. The reason is that the bursts of network traffic
cause frequent kernel view switching in a short period of time. One solution is to measure
the rate of requests for an expected workload of the server before enabling FACE-CHANGE.
5We exclude gzip here because it is not a long running application (i.e. it is difficult to ensure it executes
during the entire benchmarking measurement).
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Figure 4.7.: I/O performance results for Apache web server
If the rate is below the threshold rate, the application’s I/O throughput should be unaffected
by FACE-CHANGE. If the rate is far over the threshold rate, FACE-CHANGE may require a
more powerful CPU to handle any traffic peaks in the network without slow-down.
4.5 Summary
We make a key observation that the kernel code required by applications of different
types varies tremendously. Thus, generating a single system-wide minimized kernel will
enlarge the attack surface for all applications involved. We develop FACE-CHANGE to
facilitate dynamic kernel view switching among individual applications executed in a VM.
FACE-CHANGE transparently presents a customized kernel view to each application to
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confine its reachability of kernel code and switch this view upon context switches. In the
event that a process breaks its kernel view boundary, FACE-CHANGE is able to recover
the missing kernel code and backtrack this anomaly via analysis of the execution history.
Our evaluation demonstrates the drastic difference in the size of kernel views of multiple
applications, the effectiveness of FACE-CHANGE in revealing the attack patterns of both
user and kernel attacks, and the potential of enabling FACE-CHANGE for production VMs.
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5 FUTURE WORK
In this chapter we discuss the current limitations of our hypervisor-based active protection
security framework and propose the future work we want to explore respectively for each
component.
5.1 PROCESS-IMPLANTING
5.1.1 Stealthiness of Implanted Process
Although PROCESS-IMPLANTING tries to maximize the stealthiness of the implanted
process, some behaviors (especially for these behaviors that do not exist in the victim pro-
cess) of the implanted process may still leave some footprints, e.g., interruption of the
victim process, anomalous system call invoked from the implanted process, inter-process
communication, etc. Malicious adversary may leverage such evidences to infer the exis-
tence of the implanted process. The potential enhancement of stealthiness is to implant a
process without relying on any victim process. We will explore in this direction further in
our future work.
5.2 DRIP
5.2.1 Coverage of Test Suites
A test suite can only ensure the correctness of the tested behaviors within a specific ap-
plication and the environment in which it executes. Correspondingly, by using a test suite,
we only guarantee to preserve the driver functionalities that are covered by this test suite.
This may not cover all benign functionality within a driver, or it may require adding new
test cases in order to preserve behaviors not originally covered by a test suite. For practical
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deployment, we recommend adjusting test suites and generating new purified drivers based
on different deployments of application set. This can also be treated as the specialization
of a driver. If we do not need some of the redundant features, we can use DRIP to minimize
the functionalities of the driver.
5.2.2 False Positives of Removed Kernel API Invocations
We remove function invocations that are not necessary to our test suite, but it does not
mean all these removed invocations are useless. For example, we have found some memory
deallocation invocations have been removed. This may not impact the execution of the test
suite over a short period, but it may cause memory leaks and affect the performance of the
system in the long term. We can add some test cases to prevent these invocations from
being removed. Another simple solution is to add these well-known functions with specific
functionalities into a white list. We can simply skip them when profiling the driver.
5.2.3 Self-contained Malicious Code
Some malicious code can jeopardize the kernel without invoking any kernel APIs. For
example, some kernel rootkits can directly modify the kernel memory to achieve their ma-
licious effects. They can evade DRIP’s purification as we monitor at the granularity of API
invocations. But the functionalities of such self-contained malicious code are limited and
it is hard for them to adapt to new kernel versions. In our future work, we will enhance
DRIP to monitor at finer-grained memory operations in the profiling phase to address this
problem.
5.3 FACE-CHANGE
5.3.1 Crafted Attacks within Minimized Kernel Views
FACE-CHANGE aims to minimize the kernel attack surface for each specific application.
If a malicious attack breaks the boundary of the kernel view generated in the profiling
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phase, we can detect and report the violations. Compared to system-wide minimization
techniques, FACE-CHANGE enforces stricter constraints on kernel code visibility. It is still
possible, however, that the kernel code used by the malicious attack is within the subset
of the application’s kernel view. For example, suppose a web server is compromised and
a parasite command-and-control (C&C) server is installed. If this C&C server only uses
kernel functionalities that are within the kernel view of the host web server, FACE-CHANGE
does not need to recover any missing kernel code and it would be impossible for us to detect
its existence in this case. This problem may require a deeper understanding and finer-
grained profiling of the semantic behaviors of each application. In addition to recording an
application’s kernel usage in the profiling phase, we also need to profile the application’s
behavior, especially its interactions with the kernel. Thereby we can classify the malicious
behavior in the runtime phase if it violates the application’s known behaviors.
5.3.2 DKOM Kernel Rootkit Detection
For DKOM rootkits [53], which only manipulate kernel data, FACE-CHANGE is unable
to identify such attacks because we only monitor anomalies in kernel code execution. In
order to detect this kind of attack, we could integrate some existing works [54, 55] into




Mywork are closely related to several research areas listed below. In this chapter, I describe
some representative works from each area and compare our techniques with them.
6.1 Virtual Machine Introspection
Virtual machine introspection has been researched extensively to enhance system se-
curity. Security tools are moved from a guest VM to a hypervisor or another trusted VM.
The semantic gap [4] problem makes such out-of-VM security tools difficult to leverage
the services offered by the guest system. Semantic information needs to be re-created at
the hypervisor level. Virtual machine introspection approaches typically can be classified
into two categories: passive introspection and active introspection.
In the former category, out-of-VM security tools passively monitor the execution of
guest VM to detect anomalous execution. Livewire [5] pioneered the virtual machine in-
trospection methodology to detect malware infections by inspecting the internal states of
guest VMs. XenAccess [7], VMwatcher [6], VMscope [56], Antfarm [8] Ether [57] are
some representative out-of-box efforts to monitor the guest at the hypervisor level.
However, passive introspection approaches only report, but cannot prevent the mali-
cious behavior from happening. In contrast, active introspection approaches intervene
malicious attacks when they are detected. IntroVirt [58] leverages VM introspection to
execute vulnerability-specific predicates in a VM for intrusion reproduction. Lycosid [9]
detects hidden OS processes through cross-view validation. Then it patches the executable
code to influence the runtime of specific processes. Manitou [59] compares instruction-
page hashes with memory-page hashes at runtime. If there is no matching, it considers
that the instruction page has been corrupted and marked it as non-executable. Out-of-VM
active monitoring was proposed in Lares [10] and SIM [11]. Hooks are placed inside the
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guest operating system to intercept the events invoking the security tool. Lares can place
the security tool at another trusted virtual machine and the hooked system events trigger the
virtual machine switch. SIM gains the in-context view by creating a separate guest address
space that is protected by the hypervisor to gain the native speed.
PROCESS-IMPLANTING pushes the boundary of active introspection one step further.
We dynamically implant a general-purpose security process from the hypervisor into the
guest VM. The stealthy nature of the implanted process makes it harder to be identified
by malicious adversaries. Furthermore, we provide additional protection and coordina-
tion from the hypervisor directly to the implanted process to make it exempt from being
tampered and detected.
6.2 Kernel Driver Protection
DRIP is closely related to two categories of kernel driver protection techniques: online
driver isolation and offline driver testing.
Online Driver Isolation
Nooks [26] involves a shadow driver mechanism to conceal driver failures from ap-
plications by monitoring the state of real drivers during normal operation. It inserts itself
when failure occurs, thus improving the reliability of the overall system. SafeDrive [60]
improves kernel extension reliability by adding type-based checking to driver code and
enforcing runtime memory safety. In order to leverage user level programming tools and
reduce kernel level faults introduced by drivers, Microdriver [61] partitions an existing
driver into a kernel level driver handling performance critical tasks and a user level driver
processing low-performance issues. The Nexus [62] operating system moves the device
driver to user space and it leverages device-specific reference monitors to validate that all
the interactions between drivers and devices conform to safety specifications. To protect
untrusted device drivers from compromising a system, SUD [27] leverages recent hardware
support to confine operations of devices and allows unmodified Linux device drivers to run
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in user processes by emulating a Linux kernel environment in user space. These research
efforts are designed to isolate buggy drivers at runtime. Compared with DRIP, they incur
additional performance overhead and cannot target intentionally malicious drivers.
Offline Driver Testing
SDV [30] statically checks source code paths of device drivers to make sure they use
the Windows API correctly. DDT [31] exercises the closed source device drivers to find
bugs by using symbolic execution. These two offline approaches are designed to test buggy
drivers thoroughly but not for removing malicious behaviors from the driver. On the other
hand, both of them can complement DRIP for improving the coverage of test suites.
6.3 Emulation-Based Analysis
DRIP leverage system emulation technique to perform driver purification. Emulation-
based techniques have been widely used in malware profiling and analysis.
K-Tracer [63] dynamically analyzes a rootkit’s malicious behavior by using backward
slicing and chopping techniques. Panorama [64] leverages the system-wide taint tracking
technique to capture the privacy-breaching behavior of malware. HookFinder [65] and
HookMap [66] perform dynamic analysis to identify kernel hooks implanted by rootkits.
PoKeR [67] profiles a kernel rootkit’s behavior by traversing from static objects to locate
dynamic objects and performing address-object mapping. Instead of detecting malware,
DRIP extends the emulation platform to eliminate malicious behaviors from trojaned kernel
drivers.
Virtuoso [68] involves a technique to create introspection-based security tools automat-
ically out of a VM by tracing and combining the execution traces of In-VM programs.
RevNIC [69] is a technique that helps automatically reverse engineer the logic of a net-
work device driver and synthesize a new driver with the same functionality for a different
platform. Rather than combining traces to re-create a new binary, the goal of DRIP is to
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identify malicious logic in existing drivers and perform binary rewriting to eliminate their
malicious effects.
6.4 Kernel Minimization
Earlier research on kernel minimization was not specifically security oriented. The
primary goal of these works was to shrink the kernel’s in-memory size to adapt to the
limited hardware resources of embedded systems. Lee et al. [43] used a call graph approach
to eliminate redundant code from the Linux kernel. Chanet et al. [45] applied link-time
compaction and specialization techniques to reduce the kernel memory. He et al. [44]
reduced the memory footprint by keeping infrequently executed code on disk and loading
it on demand. Recent research has focused on minimizing the OS kernel to reduce the
attack surface exposed to applications. Kurmus et al. [42] proposed a kernel reduction
approach that automatically generates kernel build configurations based on profiling results
of expected workloads.
Compared to existing kernel minimization works, FACE-CHANGE customizes the ker-
nel code visibility for each individual application, thus minimizing the kernel attack surface
at finer time-granularity. In addition, our system is more flexible and can adapt to changes
in the execution environment and support new applications without rebooting the system.
6.5 Sandboxing
Sandboxing is a general security mechanism that provides a secure execution environ-
ment for running untrusted code.
One category of sandboxing works is to constrain the untrusted code’s capabilities via
predefined security policies. Janus [70] is a filtering approach to perform system call in-
terposition based on the predefined policy. Ostia [71] proposed a delegating architecture
to virtualize the system call interface and provides a user level sandbox to control the ac-
cess of resources. Capsicum [72] extends the Unix API to allow an application to perform
self-compartmentalization, i.e., confining itself in a sandbox that only allows essential ca-
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pabilities. Seccomp [73] is a sandboxing mechanism implemented in the Linux kernel to
constrain the system call interface of process. If the process attempts to issue the system
call that is not allowed, it will be terminated by the kernel. SELinux [74] is a security mod-
ule in the Linux kernel that enforces mandatory access-control policies on applications.
Similar to SELinux, AppArmor [75] restricts the capabilities of a program through binding
a security profile. TxBox [76] is based on system transactions to speculatively execute an
untrusted application and recover from harmful effects. Process Firewalls [77] is a kernel-
base protection mechanism to avoid resource access attacks through examining the internal
state of a process and enforcing invariants on each system call.
Another category of sandboxing approaches is to enforce access control through re-
compilation, binary rewriting, and instrumentation: PittSFIeld [78] extends software fault
isolation [79] (SFI) to x86. It checks unsafe memory writes and constrains jump targets
to aligned addresses. XFI [80] leverages control flow integrity toprevent circumvention
and support fine-grained memory access control. Vx32 [81] is a sandbox that confines the
system calls and data accesses of guest plugins without kernel modification. NaCl [82]
leverages SFI to provide a constrained execution environment for the native binary code
of browser-based application. TRuE [83] replaces the standard loader with a security-
hardened loader and leverages SFI to run untrusted code. Program shepherding [84] en-
forces security policies by monitoring control flow transfers during the execution of a pro-
gram.
In the virtualization/emulation environment, a full system is considered to be confined
in a sandbox and the protection is provided at hypervisor level: Secvisor [85] ensures that
only approved code can be executed in kernel mode to protect the kernel against code
injection attacks. NICKLE [12] enforces that only authorized kernel code can be fetched
for execution in kernel space. To guarantee the integrity of kernel hooks, HookSafe [13]
relocates hooks to a page-aligned memory space and regulates accesses to them via page-
level protection. HUKO [29] is a hypervisor-based approach to enforce mandatory access
control policies on untrusted kernel extensions. Gateway [28] isolates kernel drivers in a
different address space from the base kernel and monitors their kernel API invocations.
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FACE-CHANGE can also be considered as a sandboxing approach. The difference from
these previous works is that we sandbox each individual application by constraining its vis-
ibility of kernel code. We also enforce our approach at the hypervisor level to be transparent
to the guest system.
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7 CONCLUSION
Virtualization technology has been widely adopted in the security area to protect guest VMs
from being compromised by cyber-attacks. Existing hypervisor-based security approaches,
which are traditionally used for intrusion detection, malware analysis, and integrity check,
conduct only passive monitoring on the guest systems, but missing the capabilities of per-
forming active protection on the guest VM, such as patching the vulnerabilities, eliminating
the malicious logic, and shrinking the kernel attack surface, etc.
My research aims to expand the reach of the hypervisor to actively protect the guest
VM. In this dissertation, we present a hypervisor-based security framework that consists
of three key components, PROCESS-IMPLANTING, DRIP, and FACE-CHANGE, to provide
active protection at the level of user processes, kernel drivers, and OS kernel respectively,
within the guest VM.
PROCESS-IMPLANTING is an active virtual machine introspection technique, which
enables implantation of a security process directly from the hypervisor into the guest VM.
The dynamic nature of such implanted processmake it harder to be pinpointed by malicious
adversaries.
DRIP targets trojaned kernel drivers, i.e., malicious logic is embedded alongside the
benign code. We purify the trojaned drivers by systematically eliminating the malicious
functionality and preserving the benign logic at binary level.
FACE-CHANGE shrinks the kernel attack surface for applications running within the
guest VM. Compared to existing system-wide kernel minimization techniques, we dynam-
ically switch multiple kernel views, each customized for a different application, at runtime
to achieve kernel minimalism at finer time-granularity.
From our evaluation results on both security and performance, we demonstrate that
PROCESS-IMPLANTING, DRIP, and FACE-CHANGE can effectively provide active protec-
tion for guest VMs with minimum negative impact on the guest system execution. Fur-
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